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CHINA AND THE POWERS

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CHINA AND THE POWERS

Chapters in the History of Chinese Intercourse with Western Nations

By
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


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PUBLISHER'S FOREWORD.

The chapters contained in this volume were originally written to form part of a larger work, which, as originally projected by Mr. Ireland, was to have contained chapters on China's relations with France, Germany, and Japan, together with a concluding study of the "Conflicting Interests and Ambitions of the Great Powers in China." Owing to ill-health, Mr. Ireland was compelled to abandon this work; and other duties have now rendered its completion, as originally planned, impossible.

As the finished portion of the work is complete in itself, and as the statistical appendices contain a thorough analysis of Chinese trade during twenty years, it is believed that its value to students is sufficient to justify its publication.

One hundred and fifty copies are therefore being printed for private sale, after which printing the plates will be destroyed.

JUNE 15, 1902.



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PREFACE.

There exists among writers on Chinese affairs a wide divergence of views as to the present importance and future destiny of the Chinese people.

Historians have expressed opinions of every shade between the two extremes of regarding China as a nation which, owing to its peculiar organisation, must eventually be absorbed into the political systems of the European Powers, and the prophetic vision of China as the dominating world-influence of future centuries.

Economists have sought to show, on the one hand, that the magnificent labour supply of China, if controlled and directed by the principles of Western industrialism, would so reduce the cost of production in every direction as to effect a saving to the world comparable only to that which followed the general adoption of steam-driven machinery, while, on the other hand, it is confidently asserted that, as the introduction of Western methods into China could not be expected to raise the standard of living among the Chinese people to any considerable extent, the entrance of the vast population of the Middle Kingdom into free industrial competition with the rest of the world could only have the effect of lowering the standard of living among the labouring people of Europe and America.

The object of the present volume was to place before the public in a compact form the essential facts in regard to the political and commercial relationship

Preface

existing between China and the Powers, and to exhibit in narrative form, unhampered by a mass of unnecessary details, the course of events which has taken China out of her former position of isolation, and set her down, a great problem, if not a serious menace, in the midst of the Western nations.

In regard to the arrangement of the volume I had thought it best to devote a preliminary chapter to the examination of the various aspects of China as a problem calling for solution at the hands of the Powers. This will enable the reader to appreciate the urgent importance of the Chinese question, and may encourage him to peruse the historical chapters which follow.

Chapters II. to V., inclusive, relate to matters of fact, not of opinion, and thus require no justification. The interruption of the work at this point, as explained in the publisher's foreword, relieves me from the necessity of offering any apology for the personal views which would necessarily have been reflected in the concluding chapter as originally planned.


Having been unable to complete the work in the manner in which I undertook it, I have only consented, under special solicitation, to its private publication in a limited edition, in order that the historical matter and statistical tables which it contains might be accessible.

ALLEYNE IRELAND.

BOSTON, 1902.

CHINA AND THE POWERS

Chapters in the History of Chinese
Intercourse with Western Nations



Chapter I.

THE CHINESE PROBLEM.

The present wide-spread interest in China is due to sensational causes; but these causes, deplorable as they are in themselves, may yet serve the useful purpose of so fixing public attention on the Celestial Empire as to insure a solution, by one method or another, of the great and urgent problem which the future progress of China presents to the world.

It is not my present purpose to examine the prospects of China's political future in the light of the conflicting ambitions of the Great Powers. Such an inquiry, however exhaustive in its nature, would only lead me back to the point from which I wish to start; namely, the consideration of the Chinese people as a factor in human progress. This method of approach appears to possess some considerable advantage over the other, from the fact that, whereas the policy of the Great Powers towards China must be finally limited and determined by the attitude of China as a nation,—an uncertain quantity, only to be measured in each instance after the event,—the social and industrial development of the Chinese as a people could only be to some extent advanced or retarded in point of time by any conceivable political change effected by the intrusion of the Great Powers.

In this chapter on "The Chinese Problem," I limit myself to an examination of the economic

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aspect for a reason which appears to me sufficient; namely, that at the present day the political action of nations is determined almost entirely by economic considerations. How true this is in regard to China, how true it has been during the past three centuries, will appear in the subsequent chapters.

If the Chinese were a people like the Russians, the Germans, or the French, we (I address chiefly American and British readers) would observe any marked increase in their industrial activity or in their national aggressiveness with some misgivings, possibly, but certainly without any feeling that our own national existence, either social or economic, was seriously threatened by what we should be compelled to regard as a progressive movement in a fellow-nation. We should flatter ourselves that what a Russian or a German or a Frenchman could do, an American or an Englishman could do at least as well.

But it is precisely because the Chinaman differs from all other men that the prospect of a radical change in the Chinese life and policy is viewed by many intelligent observers with an interest not un-mixed with alarm.

Although I do not share the view held by some, that China is destined to become the greatest active power in the world, my lack of acquiescence is measured rather by my hope that the concerted action of the Great Powers will limit the expansion of China to those regions in the tropics where she

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would have all white races at a disadvantage, than by any belief that the Chinaman, if left to himself, is incapable of developing the necessary amount of self-assertion.

If we supplement an estimate of the dynamic potentiality of the Chinese people by an examination of some of the natural and artificial forces which are likely to extend or to limit the area of Chinese activity, we may form some idea of the problem which would be created by the wholesale adoption by the Chinese of those material aids to progress which we have so persistently endeavoured to thrust upon their unwilling attention.

China, with her dependencies, covers an area of 4,460,000 square miles, and has a population of about 400,000,000. In other words, her people represent one-fourth of the population of the globe, spread over about one-twelfth of its land surface. The land varies in fertility and in mineral resources in the different Provinces; but it is certain that the country contains the largest coal and iron deposits within the territory of any single nation. Von Richtofen, the German geologist, estimates that the single Province of Shansi could supply the whole world's requirements in coal and iron, at the present rate of consumption, for three thousand years; and the productiveness of the soil is at least equal to that of any equal area in the world.

Up to the present time the vast resources of the Chinese Empire, with millions of hands on the spot to develop them, have been practically closed to the

China and the Powers

world. The insignificance of the export trade of China, when compared with that of other nations, will be seen from the following rough calculations:—

EXPORTS OF DOMESTIC PRODUCE IN 1897.

		<i>Per Capita.</i>
China	\$120,000,000	\$0.30
United Kingdom	1,170,000,000	29.25
France	719,000,000	18.43
Germany	890,000,000	17.11
United States	1,032,000,000	14.74

From these figures it is seen that the average value of the annual exports *per capita* from the four Western nations is \$19.88 as compared with 30 cents *per capita* from China. If we give China the benefit of a probable overestimate of population and of a possible underestimate of exports, and if we place the exports at 40 cents *per capita*,—a liberal allowance,—we observe that at the present time it takes fifty Chinamen to place on the world's market an amount of produce equal to that distributed by one American or European.

It would of course be mere guess-work to try to estimate the exact effect which the general introduction of machinery, of improved agricultural methods, and of adequate transportation facilities, would have upon the export returns of that country; but within certain limits such a speculation may be sufficiently near the truth as to afford a basis for some general deductions.

Let us suppose, then, that during the next ten

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years China adopts Western methods to an extent which would still leave one white man equal to five Chinamen in productive efficiency. The result would be, basing our calculation on the figures given above, that China's exports would amount to not less than \$1,600,000,000,—a sum equal to the total combined value of domestic exports from Germany and France in 1897, and representing seventy-five per cent. of the total exports from the United States and the United Kingdom together.

It may be suggested that China would find a difficulty in securing markets for such a great quantity of produce, because in some countries a strong prejudice exists against Chinese goods; and it might be expected that many countries would erect formidable tariffs against Chinese manufactures. If we admit that these factors would play some part in determining the quantity and direction of Chinese exports, and that the prejudice against Chinese goods would probably operate to keep down a Chinese export trade to the United States,¹ to Australasia and Canada, and, to a lesser extent, to France and Germany, the fact must not be overlooked that a Chinaman can outwork and underlive any other worker in the world, and that this circumstance would enable him to appeal, even in countries most

¹ The trade of the United States with China is examined at length in the chapter on "The Conflicting Interests and Ambitions of the Powers in China"; but it may be mentioned here, as an evidence of China's exporting capacity, that since 1821 China has sold the United States more than \$600,000,000 worth of merchandise IN EXCESS of what she has purchased from the United States.

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hostile to him, to the natural preference of the majority of people for the cheaper product.

But the question of Chinese trade development is not primarily one of competition with the white man in his home markets, but of a rivalry with Europe, America, and Australasia in the tropical and sub-tropical markets. The importance of this fact is made more apparent if we consider the general prospects of trade development in the future. A moment's reflection serves to satisfy us that whatever increase may be looked for in the trade of the European countries, of North America, and of non-tropical Australasia, a vastly greater proportional development may be expected in the trade of the tropical and sub-tropical countries. The white man at home has reached such a high degree of efficiency as a producer and as a consumer that it cannot be foreseen that the rate of progress to be observed during the past century will be maintained during the century upon which we have just entered. The people of the tropics, on the other hand, are still in a very low stage of productive efficiency; and their value as consumers is proportionately small. I have shown elsewhere¹ that in the British Empire the productive efficiency of the tropical as compared with the non-tropical man is as 1 to 23, and that the value of the former as a consumer is as 1 to 17 compared with the value of the latter. It is certain, moreover, that in the tropics outside the British Empire — under less effi-

¹ *Tropical Colonisation*, pp. 110, 111.

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cient forms of government, and with less protection for the products of industry—the economic value of the tropical man is even less than this.

Concisely, the formula which I would deduce from the above facts is this: that the difference between actual and normally potential economic efficiency is so much greater in the tropical man than in the non-tropical man that it is reasonable to anticipate that the trade of the former could be doubled in the time which would be required to raise the trade of the latter by thirty per cent.

Now, even if we omit from our calculations the possibility (which will be examined later) of large portions of the tropics and of the sub-tropics becoming preponderatingly Chinese in the composition of their population, it is clear that in these markets we shall be compelled to enter into an open rivalry with Chinese products. The areas in which the competition of a vitalised Chinese trade would be most likely to affect American and European exports are these—and it should be noted that in each of these countries the Chinaman could settle and thrive, and that in some of them he has already done so, whilst in most of them the white man must always remain a temporary resident,—India, Ceylon, Burmah, Siam, the Straits Settlements, Borneo, New Guinea, the Pacific islands, tropical Africa, Mauritius, Brazil, Peru, Chile, the Central American republics, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela.

The commercial problem created by the prospect

of an economic awakening of China may be said to consist in its simplest form of the possible exclusion of the white races from participation in the advantages which would follow a great increase in the economic efficiency of the tropical and of the sub-tropical peoples.

Up to this point, we have, however, only considered the effect which a simple economic development of China, unaccompanied by other great changes in the national life and policy, would have upon the commercial prospects of the white nations. If we now introduce a new factor,—namely, a possible change in the social economy or habit of the Chinese people,—we find that the commercial problem becomes greatly complicated.

It is a curious fact that, notwithstanding the general spread of education, the vast majority of people appear to have but a slight knowledge of the geography of the earth. For instance, my own experience has been that not more than one person out of five amongst educated people to whom I have put the inquiry has known that Liverpool is to the east of Edinburgh, that Calcutta is within a few miles of being in the north temperate zone, and that Glasgow is in the same latitude as Southern Alaska. I refer to this because I imagine that many of the popular misconceptions about the physiological and psychological make-up of the Chinaman are to be traced to a general impression that the Chinese are a tropical people. Of course, when we deliberately set out to consider the matter, we realise

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at once that only a small part of China lies within the tropics, and that a great part of the empire enjoys a winter at least as severe as that of New England. But for most people the Chinaman falls into the same category as the Filipino, the Bengalee, and the Negro; and only those who have had reason to pay some attention to Chinese affairs bear constantly in mind the fact that the climatic discipline of the Chinaman has been that of the Frenchman, the German, the Austrian, the American, and the Briton.

It is most important that we should place the Chinaman where he belongs geographically, if we would avoid falling into the error of supposing that, as a factor in future industrial competition and in the coming struggle for race supremacy, he is no more to be taken into account than the East Indian or the Negro.

Now what manner of man is the Chinaman in point of fact? He has been described over and over again by hundreds of writers; but I select three brief descriptions, in order that we may have a clear conception of him before we proceed to discuss the prospect of his social expansion. "Experience proves," says his Excellency, Wu Ting-Fang, the Chinese ambassador at Washington, "that the Chinese as all-round labourers can easily distance all competitors. They are industrious, intelligent, and orderly. They can work under conditions that would kill a man of less hardy race; in heat that would suit a salamander or in cold that would please

a polar bear, sustaining their energies through long hours of unremitting toil with only a few bowls of rice." (*North American Review*, July, 1900.)

"The Chinese are an active, energetic race. For ages there has been with them a survival of the hardiest. Trained from youth to subsist on the most meagre diet, to get along with little sleep, and to work patiently for twelve or fourteen hours a day, these men scoff at difficulties and exertions which would, within a year, weary a European to death." (Reinsch, *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century*.)

"A people of hundreds of millions, disciplined for thousands of years to the most untiring industry and the most self-denying thrift, under conditions which would mean worse than death for our working masses. A people, in short, quite content to strive to the utmost in exchange for the simple privilege of life." (Lafcadio Hearn, *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1896.)

Such is the man, and, when we consider the area of his usefulness, we are confronted with the fact that he can live and thrive and multiply in any part of the habitable world; whilst the white man, if he is to retain his race characteristics, must always remain a bird of passage in almost every country lying between 30° N. and 30° S.

If we reject the possibility of the Chinese ever penetrating in force either to the north or to the south of the above limit, we are still forced to

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admit that the higher races cannot hope to people any of the northern hemisphere outside of Europe, North America, and Russian Asia, and that the whole of the southern hemisphere, with the exception of non-tropical Australasia and possibly of Cape Colony and Natal, must derive its future population from what we loosely call the lower races. It is significant that even in the United States, in Canada, and in Australasia, countries in which the white man has the best possible chance of development and in which he has least to fear from the competition of alien races, the dread of the Chinaman has found expression in stringent legislation limiting his immigration.

Fortunately, up to the present time, the Chinese people have turned their eyes away from extensive emigration, and have thus failed to use efficiently their superior physiological adaptability. This neglect of opportunity is attributable to a great variety of causes, most of which are sufficiently well understood by students of sociology. Amongst the most obvious may be named the extent and natural resources of the home territory, which have rendered emigration unnecessary from economic motives; the intense conservatism of the Chinese people, due, in a great measure, to the fact that until within the present century China has been absolutely self-sufficient, and has had little intercourse with foreign nations; the disinclination of the Chinaman to separate himself from his associates in the innumerable secret societies, the pro-

tection of which constitutes for him a sort of vested interest; and the impossibility of performing in foreign countries the various offices connected with the national system of ancestor-worship.

Notwithstanding these deterrent factors, Chinamen have emigrated in such numbers that, although their absence is not felt at home, their presence has exerted a powerful influence abroad. Thus in the East the Chinaman is found in ever-increasing numbers in the Malay Peninsula, in Java, in Siam, in Borneo, in New Guinea, in the Philippine Islands, in Burmah, in Sumatra, and in Mauritius; whilst he has penetrated as far west as Hawaii, Central and South America, and the West Indies.

There is every reason to suppose that throughout the tropics, possibly excepting India, the Chinaman, even should he continue to emigrate in no greater force than he has done hitherto, will gradually supersede all the native races. The reason of this is not far to seek. The one thing in which tropical countries are deficient is an effective labour supply. The economic history of the tropics during the past three centuries is largely a narrative of the efforts made by the land-owners to secure labour for the development of their properties. The autochthonous races were utilised until they disappeared under the strain of steady and severe toil. Then slavery was tried and discarded, and there followed various systems of imported contract labour. We find that the labour supply of the tropics subsequently to the abolition of slavery has consisted of

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free Negroes, for the most part quite unreliable, and of East Indian and Chinese imported contract labourers. These imported contract labourers, either East Indians or Chinese, were introduced, and in most instances are still being introduced, into Jamaica, Trinidad, Martinique, St. Lucia, Guadeloupe, British, Dutch, and French Guiana, Cuba, Peru, Hawaii, the Fiji Islands, Natal, Mauritius, the Straits Settlements, Java and Queensland; and a great number of unindentured Chinese have gone to the Philippine Islands.

As there is no possibility of white labour being utilised in most parts of the tropics, the choice lies between the Chinaman, the Negro, and the East Indian. But the Chinaman is under all circumstances a better labourer than either of the others; for he has infinitely more industry than the former, and infinitely more strength and staying power than the latter. So great is his superiority that I am satisfied from my own observation that the tropical planter would prefer a good supply of unindentured Chinamen even to East Indians bound by contract.

I have not been able to secure any reliable statistics exhibiting the effect which Chinese imported contract labour has had upon the population of the countries employing it; but the following figures relating to the population of British Guiana show, in a striking manner, the effect of East Indian immigration. And, if we accept these figures as affording a guide to the possible results of even a moderate Chinese saturation of the tropics, we shall be certainly making an underestimate.

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COMPOSITION OF POPULATION OF BRITISH GUIANA.

	<i>Census of</i> 1831	<i>Census of</i> 1861	<i>Census of</i> 1891	<i>Estimate for</i> 1901
White . . .	3.22%	7.77%	6.18%	6.00%
Black . . .	96.78%	75.48%	53.45%	44.87%
East Indian . . .	00.00%	14.98%	38.98%	47.13%
Others . . .	00.00%	1.77%	1.39%	2.00%
	<u>100.00%</u>	<u>100.00%</u>	<u>100.00%</u>	<u>100.00%</u>

In the above figures aboriginal Indians, of whom there are about 10,000, are not taken into account; and mixed races are counted as black, thus giving the black a liberal estimate.

It is seen that the whites scarcely hold their own, notwithstanding the fact that many thousands, chiefly Portuguese, have been imported as labourers. The blacks, on the other hand, have fallen in number from 96.78% to 44.87% of the population, whilst the East Indians have increased in forty years from 14.98% to 47.13%.

If we consider the peculiar character of the Chinese people, it cannot be doubted that they will have a more radical influence on the population of the tropical countries to which they emigrate than that exerted by the East Indians; and, bearing this in mind, we see that the prospect of the tropical regions becoming Chinese, socially at least, is not unreasonable.

Still, leaving out of the question a political expansion of China, it may be profitable to inquire whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the

well-known aversion of the Chinese to emigrate might be increased to such an extent as to operate as a complete check ; in other words, whether we could deprive the Chinese of the motives which impel the emigration of the small number who normally quit the country each year.

In order to determine this, we must inquire into the causes which lie at the back of Chinese emigration. Broadly speaking, Chinese emigrants may be divided into four classes : —

(1) Criminals escaping from justice.

(2) Those who are immediately threatened with persecution from the high officials of the Southern Provinces or who have already suffered such persecution.

(3) Those whose friends or relatives have emigrated, and have carried or sent back the news of the protection for the fruits of industry which is to be found in most countries governed by white men.

(4) Those who are influenced by the pictures of the prosperity and freedom of Christian countries which the missionaries paint for their following.

It is thus seen that, if the Chinese government were conducted on the principles which guide Western nations, if, in short, a vigorous reform movement were successfully carried out, the motives for emigration would no longer be strong enough to overcome the Chinaman's preference for staying at home ; and he would then remain in China, and worship the bones of his ancestors, at least until, perhaps a century hence, the population began to press on the means of subsistence.

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When emigration became an economic necessity, China might, and probably would, expand socially without pressing on over-sea territory. A glance at the map shows that the natural outlet for Chinese expansion is in Thibet, Burmah, Cochin-China, and Siam ; for, although Russia may press on China from the north, no formidable competitor exists to the south, where France is helpless in Indo-China, where Siam could not, if it would, prevent an influx of Chinese, and where England, in Burmah and in the Malay Peninsula is prepared to accept the Chinaman as an immigrant.

Under the foregoing conditions, it is clear that the Chinese saturation of the tropics may be conceivably delayed for a considerable period, and that the stress of a possible Chinese commercial competition would thus be lessened to the extent of saving the tropical and sub-tropical markets from becoming Chinese in the nature of their requirements, at any rate in the very near future.

Up to this point we have considered the question of Chinese race-supremacy in the tropics on the supposition that the natural course of events would not be interfered with by the adoption of a definite policy of expansion by the Chinese government. But it is by no means beyond the range of possibility that China may, at no distant date, embark on a policy of territorial expansion. Indeed, there are many reasons for supposing that, given the necessary conditions, China would certainly look for an extension of her political influence in new directions.

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If those who predict the complete political dismemberment of China are correct in their forecast, there will be of course no Chinese national policy in the future; but I think that there is ample reason to doubt the correctness of this view.

Two powerful factors combine to insure the endurance of China as a political unit: one is the hostile attitude of the United States and of Great Britain towards any wholesale cutting up of the empire; and the other is that throughout the central and southern Provinces the climatic conditions will always render impossible a permanent occupation by white men. It may indeed be doubted whether the United States and Great Britain, although they might forbid the permanent occupation of Chinese territory by France, Germany, or Italy, would go so far as to forcibly oppose the southern extension of Russia's Siberian boundary or the acquisition of Corea by Japan. But the utmost that is at all likely to happen is that Russia should occupy Manchuria and Mongolia, and that Japan should take possession of the Korean peninsula.

If this should occur, China would certainly seek compensation to the south, where, from climatic reasons, no European race could hope successfully to resist her advance; and the absorption of Cochin-China, and, more remotely, of Siam and Southern Thibet, would follow.

Even if we conceive China as shorn of her northern Provinces, and for a time checked in her southern advance, we still have a great Chinese

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nation, at least capable of a definite foreign policy. It seems probable that, whatever may be the immediate issue of the present situation, the China which remains intact will develop into a formidable military and naval power.

The "Boxer" revolution, which in its origin is a patriotic movement, having as its main object the achievement of a policy of "China for the Chinese," will probably be followed by a great increase in the military and naval forces of the empire. With 400,000,000 people to draw from, with the revenue which a reformed administration could procure from such a population, and with the unlimited natural resources of the country at her disposal, China could easily make herself the dominant power of the Far East.

In this position, what would her policy be? Would she be content to accept the loss of Manchuria and Mongolia as an accomplished fact, or would she embark on a campaign of reprisal?

In any event, the industrial development which may be expected to follow even a moderate degree of internal reform, if accompanied by the adoption of Western industrial methods, will soon set China at work seeking foreign markets. If these are accorded her, she may, in the absence of an aggressive national policy, look forward to a long period of peaceful progress, relieved by an overflow of population to the south, unaccompanied by any extension of her political influence. But, if she finds her goods shut out from Japan, from Russian

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and French Asia, from the Philippines, and from the Dutch East Indies, China may be forced to follow the example of Great Britain, and occupy large tracts of land, for trade purposes, which otherwise she might have been content to see under the political control of other nations.

The prospect of a powerful and united China driven through the narrow commercial policy of the more civilised Powers into a fight for markets is not a pleasant one; and it is doubtful whether, having secured them, she would select rather to follow the lead of Great Britain in throwing them open to the world or to take a leaf out of the book of France, and practically close her colonial ports to all foreign merchandise.

The Chinese problem is serious enough already, without the added complications which would follow prolonged hostilities; and it is to be hoped that the Powers will realise that the best thing to be done, after exacting full reparation for the recent outrages, is to leave China to develop naturally along the lines of least resistance.

Chapter II.

EARLY EUROPEAN INTERCOURSE WITH CHINA.

The exact time of the first European intercourse with China is still a matter of doubt. If we accept "Europe" as a political rather than a geographical term, the conjectural period of Chinese intercourse with Europe extends from the eighth century before Christ to the second century of the Christian era.

The various conjectures covering this period may be briefly summarised. The prophet Isaiah¹ in the passage which begins, "Thus saith the Lord, In an acceptable time have I heard thee, and in a day of salvation have I helped thee," says, "Behold, these shall come from far: and, lo, these from the north and from the west; and these from the land of Sinim." If, as some writers assert, the land of Sinim was China, Isaiah was the first Western writer who is known to have mentioned the Celestial Empire.

It is said that after the dispersion of the Jews, 742 B.C., wandering companies of the Ten Tribes found their way to China. In support of this view, it is pointed out that a remarkable similarity exists between many Chinese customs and ceremonies and those of the Jews; for instance, the feasts of the new moons, the number of the civil courts, the

¹ Isaiah, xlix. 8-12. See *The Land of Sinim*, by Walter N. Lowrie, 2d edition (Philadelphia, 1850), and *Bibliotheca Sinica*, by Henri Cordier (Paris, 1885), vol. ii. p. 876.

principle of a life for a life, the patriarchal form of government, tithes, night-watches, eating sacrificed offerings and making merry, and the use of phylacteries. The Jewish high priest wore eight garments and a girdle, could not marry a widow or a divorced woman, entered into the *Sanctum Sanctorum* once a year, was priest and law-giver, and could alone pray for the people,—all characteristics of the Chinese as well as of the Jewish ceremonial. Two Arab travellers, Ibn Vahab and Abuzaid, who visited China in the ninth century of our era, left a narrative of their adventures, in which Jews in China are referred to; and, although this in no way directly supports the claim of the earlier Jewish migration, the fact is of interest as an evidence of the wide dispersion of the Jews at that period, in conformity with the decree, "The Lord shall scatter thee among all people, from the one end of the earth even unto the other."¹

The Greek historian Arrian, a disciple of Epictetus, who flourished in the second century before Christ, speaks of the *Sinae* or *Thinae*, a people of remote Asia, generally identified as the Chinese; and Strabo, the Greek geographer (first century before Christ), in his Geography refers to a map of Eratosthenes (third century before Christ) on which was marked Thina at the eastern extremity of the earth, in the latitude of Rhodes, which

¹ Deuteronomy, xxviii. 64. For an account of the Jews in China, consult *Versuch einer Geschichte der Juden in Sina*, C. G. von Murr (Halle, 1806); *Essai sur les Juifs de la Chine*, l'Abbé A. Sionnet (Paris, 1837); and *The Jews in China*, James Finn (London, 1843).

would correspond sufficiently with the ancient Chinese capital.

Amongst the early Latin writers, both Horace and Virgil (first century before Christ) refer to a people called *Seres* and to the fabrics *serica* and *bombycina*, the former possibly and the latter certainly a silken fabric; but whether the *Seres* were the Chinese or a people living to the west of China, who bought silk from the Chinese and then passed it on to Rome, remains undecided.

Gutzlaff thus sums up the argument for a very early Roman intercourse with China: "The intercourse between the Chinese and the Roman Empire must have been carried on at a very early period. Whether we recognise the latter under the Chinese name *Fuh-lin* or *Ta-tsing*, of which the Chinese give us a splendid description, without pointing out the situation of this empire, matters very little. Rome stood in want of silk, silk was only brought from China, and therefore some commercial relation must have existed."¹ But this neat syllogism really carries us no further in the direction of our inquiry; for, if we admit that Rome had silk, and that silk could only come from China, the trade might have been carried on for centuries by means of middlemen,—the Parthians, for instance,—without any direct contact of China and Rome.

Coming now to the commencement of the Chris-

¹C. Gutzlaff, *A Sketch of Chinese History, Ancient and Modern*, vol. ii. p. 102.

tian era, the most interesting conjecture to be noted is that Saint Thomas, the Apostle, visited China, and built a church at Kambalu (Peking). Although there is little evidence of this fact, beyond the statement of Assemani,¹ titular Archbishop of Tyre, and librarian of the Vatican Library in the early part of the eighteenth century, there is a strong presumption in favour of Saint Thomas having gone as far as Madras;² and, if he did not go to China, it is quite possible that some of his immediate disciples visited that country.

References to Saint Thomas as the Apostle of China are to be found in the Breviary of the Church of Malabar and in the Epitome of the Syrian Canons;³ but the legend rests on such slight testimony that it is not worthy of credence.

Probably the earliest direct reference to China in Western writings is to be found in Ptolemy's Geography (γεωγραφικὴ ὑφήγησις), written in the second century A.D.⁴ The first undisputed direct intercourse between China and Europe occurred during the reign of the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who sent a number of merchants to China by the sea route in 161, in order to try to establish a regular trade in silk. The mission was

¹ W. H. Medhurst, *China: Its State and Prospects*, p. 221.

² L'Abbé Huc, *Christianity in China*, vol. i. pp. 17-32 (New York, 1857).

³ Gutzlaff, *ut supra*, vol. ii. pp. 39, 40.

⁴ S. Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom*, vol. ii. pp. 418, 419 (4th edition, New York, 1871).

a failure, as the Chinese showed themselves averse to dealing with the foreigners.¹

Following the unsuccessful attempt of the Roman traders is a period of five centuries, during which the only suggestion of European intercourse with China—prior to the arrival of the Nestorian missionary O-lo-pên—is contained in a passage from a Syrian writer, Ebedjesus, who mentions that some writers—with whom, however, he did not agree—claimed that the metropolitan see of China was instituted by Achæus, Archbishop of Seleucia, and head of the orthodox Chaldean Christians from 411 to 415. L'Abbé Huc, who was naturally anxious to place the first Christian mission to China at a date prior to the Nestorian heresy, argues that, if the metropolitan see of China was instituted by Saliba-Zacha, Patriarch of the Nestorians from 711 to 728, as is asserted by Ebedjesus, it is a proof that the Nestorian O-lo-pên, who arrived in China in 650, was not the first Christian missionary to visit China; for the institution of a metropolitan see presupposed a flourishing church already established, and the time which elapsed between the arrival of O-lo-pên and the period of Saliba-Zacha (about sixty-five years) would not have sufficed to produce in China a state of Christianity which would have justified the institution of the metropolitan see.² Thus, according to the Abbé,

¹ Sir John Francis Davis, *China: A General Description of that Country and its Inhabitants*, vol. i. p. 3.

² L'Abbé Huc, *ut supra*, vol. i. pp. 41, 42.

there must have been Christian missionaries in China before the time of O-lo-pên.

Leaving the conjectures of the Abbé Huc, we come once more to solid ground, by reference to the stone inscriptions of Si-gnan-fou, bearing the date 781 A.D. This tablet was discovered at Si-gnan-fou in the Province of Shan-si in 1625. It was erected in 781 A.D., to commemorate the introduction of Christianity into China by the Nestorian missionary O-lo-pên. The inscription, which was written by Lu-Siu-yen, Court Councillor of Kien-Chung, ninth emperor of the Tang Dynasty, runs in part: "In the reign of the Taitsung, the illustrious and holy enlarger of the Tang Dynasty, there was in Judea a man of superior virtue, called O-lo-pên, who, guided by the azure clouds, bearing the true Scriptures, and observing the laws of the winds, made his way through dangers and difficulties. In the year A.D. 636 he arrived at Chang-ngan. The emperor instructed his minister, Duke Tang-Hiuenling, to take the imperial sceptre and go out to the western suburbs, receive the guest, and conduct him to the palace. The Scriptures were translated in the library of the palace. The emperor, in his private apartments, made inquiry regarding the religion; and, fully satisfied that it was correct and true, he gave special commands for its promulgation.

"The document (of promulgation), bearing date Chingkwán (the reigning title of Taitsung), 12th year, 7th month (August, A.D. 639), runs thus:

'Religion is without an invariable name. Saints are without any permanent body. In whatever region they are, they give instruction, and privately succor the living multitudes. O-lo-pên, a man of great virtue, belonging to the kingdom of Judea, bringing the Scriptures and images from afar, has come and presented them at our capital. On examining the meaning of his instruction, it is found to be pure, mysterious, and separate from the world. On observing its origin, it is seen to have been instituted as that which is essential to mankind. Its language is simple, its reasonings are attractive, and to the human race it is beneficial. As is right, let it be promulgated throughout the empire. Let the appropriate Board build a Judean church in the Righteous and Holy street of the capital, and appoint thereto twenty-one priests.'"¹

The period between the mission of O-lo-pên and the arrival in China of Marco Polo in 1275 is rather bare of records. Beyond the narrative of the Arab travellers, Abuzaid and Ibn Vahab, there is little to be noted except the Prester John myth,² which was extraordinarily persistent during the Middle Ages, and which is connected with China by the fact that Marco Polo makes several refer-

¹ In regard to the inscriptions of Si-gnan-fou see Huc's *Christianity in China*, vol. i. pp. 44-74, and S. Wells Williams's *The Middle Kingdom*, vol. ii. pp. 290-297 (4th edition, New York, 1871).

² For the story of the Prester John myth consult Colonel Sir Henry Yule's article, "Prester John," in vol. xix. of the 9th edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, pp. 714-718.

ences to the supposititious monarch,¹ more particularly where he describes his descendants as a band of Christians occupying a territory called Tenduk, north of Peking,—a fact supported by the evidence of Friar John of Montecorvino, Archbishop of Kambalu (Peking) in the early part of the fourteenth century.

Before passing to a consideration of that period of European intercourse with China which commenced with Marco Polo's travels and extended to the beginning of the seventeenth century,—a division which is, I think, justified by the fact that most writers date the modern intercourse with China from 1600,—it may be well to note some references to Western countries which are to be found in the Chinese records, as we have thus far approached the subject from the standpoint of Western writers.

Frequent mention is made in ancient Chinese histories of a country called *Tha-tsin* (variously written *Tatsin*, *Tats'in*, *Ta-ts'in*, *Ta-tsin* by translators) and of a country, province, or city, named *Fuh-lin* (*Fu-lin*). If we could be certain to what places these terms were applied by the Chinese, we should have some guide by which to check the statements of the Western writers whose works have been quoted above. Unfortunately, however, scholars disagree on this point. The whole question has been very carefully examined by Hirth,² and his

¹ Marsden's *Travels of Marco Polo* (London, 1818) pp. 190, 195, and 236.

² F. Hirth, *China and the Roman Orient: Researches into their Ancient and Mediæval Relations as presented in Old Chinese Records* (Leipzig, 1885).

conclusions as well as those of other writers may be briefly stated.

"We are probably safe in assuming that the country of *Ta-ts'in*, under its old name *Li-kan*, was not known to the Chinese prior to B.C. 120."¹ "Fu-lin was merely another name for *Ta-ts'in*, introduced by the Nestorians."² "The old sound of the name Fu-lin may be safely assumed to have been But-lim or But-lam (Bethlehem?). . . . To see the name of the town of Bethlehem as the birthplace of the Messiah extended to the country to which it belongs is by no means singular, if we consider that this was done by religious enthusiasts who must have thought it a great privilege to come from the Holy Land."³ "Chinese historians mention a number of embassies which were sent to the emperors of China by all the Asiatic nations, and even by the Eastern Roman Empire, which they called *Ta-thsin*, or *Greater China*."⁴

"Much has been written about the origin of that name of *Tatsin*, which became that by which the

¹ Hirth, *ut supra*, pp. 137, 138.

² Hirth, *ut supra*, p. 286.

³ Hirth, *ut supra*, pp. 289, 290.

⁴ G. Pauthier, *Histoire des Relations Politiques de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, p. 17.

Some writers, notably Lacouperie, do not agree with Pauthier's interpretation of *Ta-thsin* as *Great China*. But I think that Pauthier's view receives strong support from the fact that until very recent times the Chinese authorities have always in their decrees and proclamations referred to all territories outside China as dependencies of the Chinese Empire. Even as late as the missions of Lord Amherst and Lord Macartney, banners were carried in advance of the embassies on their way to Peking, bearing the legend "Tribute Bearers."

Roman Empire and especially the Roman Orient was known to the Chinese; but no satisfactory explanation has been given as yet.”¹ “Thus *Ta-Tsin* may mean either the Roman Empire of Byzantium or Judea or Persia, or it may be a general appellation for all the countries of the West. Just as at the present day the Chinese apply the word *Si-yang* to the country of all the nations of Europe, and even sometimes also to that of the Americans.”²

Without pretending to any original research in this direction, I am inclined to believe, after consulting such authorities as are available, that the Chinese used the term *Tha-tsin* in a broad sense, to indicate generally the far western countries, as in England we speak of Greater Britain without reference to any particular part of the empire, or as in the United States we refer to “the West” without special application to any single State. Perhaps a better analogy may be drawn between the Chinese use of *Tha-tsin* and our use of “the East” or “the Far East.”

As the first reference in the Chinese histories to *Tha-tsin*, under its old name *Li-kan*, is to be found in the *Shih-chi*, written about B.C. 91, by Ssu-ma Ch'ien,³ it is seen that China had no earlier record of Europe than Europe had of China. Hirth, in his *China and the Roman Orient*, has translated ex-

¹ Terrien de Lacouperie, *Western Origin of the Early Chinese Civilisation*, pp. 242, 243.

² L'Abbé Huc, *ut supra*, vol. i. p. 58.

³ Hirth, *ut supra*, p. 137.

tracts from seventeen Chinese histories, ranging in date from B.C. 91 to A.D. 1724; but they contain little which would be of any interest to the general reader.

In picking up again the thread of our narrative, it must be noted that, although Marco Polo and his father and uncle were the first Europeans to bring back from China any lengthy and detailed account of that country, two Franciscan friars, John de Plano Carpini and William of Rubruk, had visited Tartary, the former being present at the election of Kuyuk, grandson of Jenghiz Khan, to the Khanate of Tartary in 1246 A.D.

The circumstances under which Marco Polo first went to China are briefly told.¹

Marco Polo's father, Nicolo Polo, and his uncle, Maffio Polo, were merchants of Venice. They embarked together on a trading voyage to Constantinople about the year 1250. After disposing of their merchandise, they decided to make a journey to Western Tartary, a country in which at that time there was a great demand for costly jewels and ornaments. They left Constantinople about the year 1254, and after a long journey reached the court of Barkah, chief of the Western Tartars.

¹ For an account of Marco Polo and his travels see *The Travels of Marco Polo*, by William Marsden (London, 1818); *The Travels of Marco Polo, greatly amended and enlarged from valuable early manuscripts, recently published by the French Society of Geography, and in Italy by Count Baldelli Boni*, by Hugh Murray (New York, 1845); and *The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian, concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East, newly translated and edited with Notes*, by Colonel Henry Yule (London, 1871), 2 vols.

After remaining a year with Barkah, they set out on their return journey to Constantinople; but, owing to the outbreak of war between Barkah and Hulagu, a chief of the Eastern Tartars, the ordinary route was closed. Accordingly, they proceeded by a circuitous route, which led them to the city of Bokhara. Here they met a Tartar nobleman, who was on his way to the Court of Kubali Khan, Emperor of China, as an envoy of Hulagu. By this man they were persuaded to give up their plans of returning immediately to Europe in favour of a visit to Kubali Khan, whose good-will was assured them. The journey occupied a year; and on their arrival at the Court they were treated with great consideration by the Chinese monarch, who, after inquiring closely into the affairs of Europe, decided to send them back to Italy as ambassadors to the Pope. They arrived at Acre in April, 1269. The first news which greeted them was the death of Pope Clement IV.; and, acting on the advice of the Papal Legate, they decided to await the election of the new Pope before presenting themselves at Rome.

They then proceeded to Venice, where Nicolo learned that his wife had died in childbirth in 1254, shortly after his original departure for Constantinople, leaving him a son, Marco, who was now about sixteen years old. This son became the famous traveller.

The election of the new Pope was, however, greatly delayed; and, after waiting two years, the

Polos decided to return to China, leaving their mission unaccomplished. They started by way of Acre, where they secured letters from the Papal Delegate. But, before their ship was out of sight of land, news was received that the Papal Delegate at Acre had himself been elected Pope. The Venetians were recalled, and furnished with Letters Papal. About the end of 1271 the three Polos, Nicolo, Maffio, and Marco, commenced their long overland journey to China.

On their arrival at the Court of Kubali Khan they were well received; and the emperor, taking a liking to Marco, gave him an appointment in his household. He rose subsequently to the enjoyment of high office, being at one time governor of the city of Yang-chow. Whilst in the service of Kubali Khan, Polo travelled extensively in Eastern Asia. He visited the northern Provinces of China, Yunnan, Burmah, Cochin-China, and India. The circumstances under which he finally returned to Europe, and the curious chances which led to the writing of his *Travels*, read like the pages of a fairy tale.

After spending seventeen years in China, the Polos—for Marco's father and uncle had remained with him—began to yearn for their native land; and they approached Kubali Khan with a request that they might be permitted to return home. Kubali, however, was ready to grant them anything but this; and it began to appear as though the Venetians were doomed to die in a strange land. About

this time there arrived from Persia an embassy from Arghun, the prince of that country, and a grand-nephew of Kubali. The ambassadors brought the news of the death of Arghun's wife, who on her death-bed had requested that her successor should be a princess of the imperial house of China. The object of the embassy was to secure such a princess. "The application was taken in good part," says Marco Polo; "and, under the direction of his majesty, choice was made of a damsel aged seventeen, extremely handsome and accomplished (*moult bele dame et avenant*), whose name was Kogatin, and of whom the ambassadors, upon her being shown to them, highly approved."

Having secured the princess, the ambassadors set out on their return journey; but, after travelling overland for several months, they found their way obstructed by the disturbed state of the country, and were compelled to return to the capital. Here they met Marco Polo, who had just returned from a voyage to the East Indies; and, after consultation with him, it was decided that the attempt should be made to reach Persia by the sea route. Accordingly, Kubali Khan fitted out a fleet of fourteen great ships, well found, and provisioned for two years. When the time of departure arrived, the ambassadors urged that the Polos should be permitted to accompany them, pointing out that their great experience of the sea would insure the safety of the princess. Kubali Khan finally yielded to their entreaties; and the princess, ac-

accompanied by the ambassadors and the three Polos, left the port of Chin Chew,¹ in the Province of Fuh Kien, early in the year 1292.

On the arrival of the expedition at Ormuz in the Persian Gulf, our travellers were informed of the death of Kubali Khan, which had taken place in 1294, and of the death of Arghun, whose bride the princess was to have been. They found the country in a disturbed state; but later Ghazan, the son of Arghun, established his authority, ascended the throne, and married the fair and accomplished Kogatin.

The Polos resumed their journey, and after many adventures reached Venice in 1295. But in Venice stories of their death had long been current; and, on presenting themselves in their dwelling, they found it occupied by distant relatives, who refused to recognise them. Finally, they succeeded in establishing their identity. For three years the Polos lived quietly in their native city, being relieved, by the death of Kubali Khan, from their promise to return to China. In 1298, however, war broke out between Venice and Genoa; and at the naval engagement of Curzola, fought on the 6th of September, 1298, Marco Polo, who was gentleman-commander (*sopracomito*) of one of the galleys under the Venetian Admiral Andrea Dandolo, was taken prisoner, and carried off to Genoa. Whilst in prison in that city, he became acquainted

¹ There is a conflict of evidence on this point. Some authorities assert that the expedition sailed from Hia-muen, the modern Amoy.

with a literary man, a Genoese, named Rustichello (written also Rusticiano, Rustighello, Rustigiello), who, from frequent conversations with Marco Polo and with the assistance of the traveller's notes, which had been procured from Venice, wrote out *The Travels of Marco Polo*.

The Travels contain the first reliable and detailed account of China published in Europe. We are not concerned here with the substance of Marco Polo's narrative, which consists of descriptions of the Court of Kubali Khan, of the various Chinese Provinces, of the different foreign countries he visited whilst in the service of the emperor, and of an account of the more important internal affairs which passed under his notice.

During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries European notices of China are confined almost entirely to the records of the Roman Catholic missionaries,¹ although there was maintained during that period considerable trade between China and the great Italian merchants. The names most intimately associated with the spread of Christianity in China in those early days are those of John of Montecorvino, who arrived in China in 1292 (just at the time when the Polos were leaving the country), and of Friar Odoric, who spent three years in China early in the fourteenth century.

¹ For an account of the early Roman Catholic missions in China see *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses écrites des Missions étrangères* (edition published by J. G. Merrigot, le jeune, Paris, 1780-1783), 26 volumes, of which 16-26 relate to China. The standard work in English is *Christianity in China, Tartary, and Thibet*, by l'Abbé Huc, 2 vols. (New York, 1857).

During the sixteenth century the Roman Catholic missions in China were very active under the guidance of Alessandro Valignani, Michael Roger, and more particularly of Matthieu Ricci.

In the year 1517 there arrived in China the Portuguese Rafael Perestrello, who was the first man to navigate to China a vessel under a European flag. He was shortly followed by Ferdinand Andrade, who succeeded in making friends with the Chinese authorities at Canton and in laying the foundations of what might have become an important commercial settlement. Unfortunately, however, Ferdinand's brother Simon, who appears to have been a swashbuckler of a most advanced type, came out in the following year, and made himself so obnoxious to the Chinese authorities that he was driven out of the country in 1521. In 1557 the Portuguese established themselves at Macao, near Canton, which still remains in their possession. Macao was at one time a thriving port; but the rise of Hongkong killed the Macao trade, and left the town with only this claim to notice,— that Camoens, the Portuguese poet, probably wrote a great part of the *Lusiads* there.

I do not intend to deal any further with Portuguese intercourse with China, as it ceased to have any importance fully two centuries ago.¹

The only other point to be noted during the six-

¹For the history of the Portuguese in China consult *An Historical Sketch of the Portuguese Settlements in China*, by Sir Andrew Ljungsted (Boston, 1836).

teenth century is the despatch to China in 1567 of two Russian envoys to the Emperor Lung-king. The envoys failed to see the emperor, as they had not provided themselves with presents.

From the beginning of the seventeenth century onward it is more convenient to deal with Chinese intercourse with Europe, the United States, and Japan in chapters devoted to the intercourse of China with each Power separately, leaving to the last a summary of the conflicting interests and ambitions of the Powers in China to-day.

Chapter III.

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA.

The definitive treaty of peace, under the terms of which Great Britain recognised the independence of the United States of America, was signed on Sept. 3, 1783; and five months later, on the 22d of February, 1784, the first American ship to make the China voyage left New York Harbour. This vessel was the *Empress of India*, owned by a company of New York and Philadelphia merchants, and commanded by John Green, Esq.

For a narrative of the voyage, as well as of two others to Canton, and for much interesting matter in regard to the early Chinese trade, we are indebted to the journals of Major Samuel Shaw,¹ at one time aide-de-camp to General Knox, who went out on the *Empress of China* as supercargo, and was subsequently, in 1785, appointed the first American consul in China, "without being entitled to receive any salary, fees, or emoluments whatsoever."

The *Empress of China* arrived at Whampoa, fourteen miles below Canton, on the 28th of August, 1784; and the American flag was unfurled for the first time in a Chinese port.

The trade of which the *Empress of India* was the pioneer soon grew to considerable dimensions; and by the year 1819, or, as it was then measured,

¹ *The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, the First American Consul at Canton. With a Life of the Author by Josiah Quincy.* Boston, 1847.

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the season of 1818-19, the value of imports into China in American vessels was \$9,876,208.

The conditions under which foreign trade was permitted at Canton in the early days were peculiar. The Emperor of China appointed ten or twelve merchants,—known locally as the “Hong Merchants” or the “Co Hong,”—who alone were permitted to trade with the foreigners. These men were the medium through which the government collected the customs duties; and they were, in addition, held responsible for the good conduct of the foreign traders. An arrangement which appeared very favourable to the foreign trader was a kind of insurance fund called the “Consoo fund,” which was raised by imposing a small import duty on all imports in excess of the ordinary tariff. This fund was devoted, in theory, to paying off to all foreign creditors, without distinction, the debts of any Hong merchant who might become bankrupt; but, in practice, the fund was called on to furnish lubrication for a number of officials, birthday presents for the Emperor, and so forth.

In 1842 the war between England and China which had arisen through disputes in regard to the opium trade was terminated by the Treaty of Nanking; and the five ports of Canton, Amoy, Fuhchau, Ningpo, and Shanghai were opened to foreign trade. As this promised considerable commerce for the United States, President Tyler determined to send out an embassy to China for the

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purpose of negotiating a treaty of friendship, amity, and commerce. The first reference to China in the *United States Statutes at Large* is one — dated March 3, 1843 — appropriating \$40,000 “to enable the President to establish the future commercial relations between the United States and the Chinese Empire on terms of national equal reciprocity.” It was provided in this statute (No. 3, chap. 90, *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 5, p. 624) that no one should be appointed to the China mission except by the advice and counsel of the Senate, and that no one person should receive a greater salary than \$9,000, exclusive of outfit. The post of envoy was offered to Mr. Edward Everett, at that time Minister to the Court of St. James; and, on his declining it, Mr. Caleb Cushing was appointed. His instructions¹ were to proceed to Peking, and deliver the following letter to the Emperor Taukwang:—

I, John Tyler, President of the United States of America [here follows a list of the States], send you this letter of peace and friendship signed by my own hand.

I hope your health is good. China is a great empire, extending over a great part of the world. The Chinese are numerous. You have millions and millions of subjects. The twenty-six United States are as large as China, though our people are not so numerous. The rising sun looks upon the great mountains and great rivers of China. When he sets, he looks upon rivers and mountains equally large in the United States. Our territories extend from one great ocean to the other; and on the West we are divided from your dominions only by the sea. Leaving the mouth of

¹ C. W. Cushing's full instructions, together with a letter from Daniel Webster in regard to his mission, are to be found in *Senate Executive Documents*, Twenty-eighth Congress, Second Session, No. 138 in vol. 8, 1844-45.

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one of our great rivers, and going constantly towards the setting sun, we sail to Japan and to the Yellow Sea.

Now my words are that the governments of two such great countries should be at peace. It is proper and according to the will of Heaven that they should respect each other and act wisely. I therefore send to your court Caleb Cushing, one of the wise and learned men of this country. On his first arrival in China he will inquire for your health. He has strict orders to go to your great city of Peking, and there to deliver this letter. He will have with him secretaries and interpreters.

The Chinese love to trade with our people, and to sell them tea and silk, for which our people pay silver and sometimes other articles. But, if the Chinese and the Americans will trade, there shall be rules, so that they shall not break your laws or our laws. Our minister, Caleb Cushing, is authorised to make a treaty to regulate trade. Let it be just. Let there be no unfair advantage on either side. Let the people trade not only at Canton, but also at Amoy, Ningpo, Shanghai, Fuhchan, and all such other places as may offer profitable exchanges both to China and the United States, provided they do not break your laws nor our laws. We shall not take the part of evil-doers. We shall not uphold them that break your laws. Therefore, we doubt not that you will be pleased that our messenger of peace, with this letter in his hand, shall come to Peking, and there deliver it; and that your great officers will by your order make a treaty with him to regulate affairs of trade, so that nothing may happen to disturb the peace between China and America. Let the treaty be signed by your own imperial hand. It shall be signed by mine, by the authority of our great council, the Senate.

And so may your health be good, and may peace reign.

Written at Washington this twelfth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-three. Your good friend.

On his arrival in China, Mr. Cushing learned that there was no hope of his being received by the emperor, as he had not come in the character of a tribute-bearer; and he confined himself, therefore, to negotiating the treaty of Wanghia, the first American treaty with China, which was signed by Mr. Caleb Cushing and by Kiyong, the Chinese Imperial Commissioner, on July 3, 1844.

The Treaty of Wanghia consisted of a preamble

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and thirty-four articles, to which was appended a tariff of duties. Briefly, the arrangements under the treaty were these:—

(1) Americans were to be free to trade at the five treaty ports opened by Great Britain. They were to be given all privileges which might be from time to time granted to the subjects of other nations.

(2) Citizens of the United States were to be free to reside on shore at the treaty ports, and to build places of business, residences, hospitals, churches, and to lay out cemeteries; but these locations were to be fixed by mutual agreement between the Chinese and American authorities, and no foreigner was to be permitted to travel beyond the treaty limits.

(3) Protection for the persons and property of American citizens was to be furnished by the local authorities.

(4) Americans were not to be subject to Chinese jurisdiction for any crime committed in China, but were to be tried and punished after conviction by the consul or such other public functionary as the United States might appoint.

(5) Communications between the superior authorities of the United States and China were to be conducted on a basis of equality in the form of mutual communications (*chau hwei*); communications between inferior officers were to have the same form; inferior officers of one nation addressing superior officers of the other were to do so in the form of memorials (*shin chin*); private indi-

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viduals, in addressing superior officers, were to employ the style of petition (*pin ching*). In no case were terms or styles to be suffered which might be offensive to either party.¹

(6) Notwithstanding the general rule to the contrary, any citizen of the United States who should be detected in conducting a contraband trade or a trade in opium should be subject to punishment by the Chinese authorities.

The effect of the treaty of Wanghia was to stimulate the export trade from the United States to China in a remarkable manner, the value of such exports rising from \$469,000 in 1840 to \$2,079,341 in 1845.

Up to 1844, in which year Mr. Caleb Cushing went out to China as the first envoy of the United States to Peking, the relations between the two countries were confined to the interchange of products. The principal imports into the United States from China were tea, China-ware, nankins, and silks: the principal exports from the United States to China were American cotton goods, lead, ginseng, specie, and bills of credit on London.² The growth of the American trade with China is shown in the following table which gives the value of imports from and exports to China at five-year intervals from 1825 to 1900:—

¹ In Chinese official documents it was customary to speak of foreigners as "barbarians," and a foreign ambassador was described as "the barbarian eye."

² *Remarks on China and the China Trade*, by R. B. Forbes. Boston, 1844.

	<i>Imports into the United States from China.</i>	<i>Exports of domestic produce of United States to China.</i>
1825	\$7,533,115	\$160,059
1830	3,858,141	156,759
1835	5,987,187	335,868
1840	6,640,829	469,186
1845	7,285,914	2,079,341
1850	6,593,462	1,485,961
1855	11,048,726	1,533,057
1860	13,566,581	7,170,784
1865	5,130,643	6,502,898
1870	14,628,487	6,421,163
1875	13,480,440	1,465,934 ¹
1880	21,769,618	1,011,315
1885	16,292,169	6,395,178
1890	16,260,471	2,943,790
1895	20,545,829	3,602,741
1900	26,896,117	15,258,748

Treaty relations once established and trade between the United States and China increasing by leaps and bounds, a great many practical questions arose regarding the intercourse of the foreign community with the natives. One important matter to be settled was the status of the United States consuls. By the treaty of Wanghia the United States had secured the right of administering justice to its own citizens in China. The consulates had been placed on a satisfactory basis by the act of March 1, 1855;² but the details of the consular jurisdiction were difficult to arrange, and President Pierce in 1856 and President Buchanan in 1857 transmitted messages to Congress on the subject.³

¹ Up to and including 1875 the exports to China include specie.

² *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 10, pp. 619-621.

³ *Senate Exec. Docs.*, No. 32, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 10; *House Exec. Docs.*, No. 125, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 10; *Senate Exec. Docs.*, No. 6,

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In 1853, when the Tae-ping rebellion was at its height, Mr. Robert McLane was sent out to China to look after American interests. His instructions,¹ dated Nov. 9, 1853, were to the effect that, if the revolutionary party was successful, he was to recognise the government *de facto*, whilst, if several independent governments were set up, he was to present himself to each as the accredited representative of the United States. The imperial authorities had always shown themselves averse to direct communication with foreign envoys, and it soon appeared that the rebel leaders would only communicate with the United States commissioner on their own terms. On May 24, 1854, Commander Franklin Buchanan, of the United States steamship *Susquehanna*, addressed a letter to the commander-in-chief of the rebel forces, requesting that the United States commissioner, Mr. McLane, be given an opportunity of entering into direct correspondence with the rebel leader, Tae-ping Wan. The reply to this letter is sufficiently curious to merit insertion here, as it is an evidence that the rebels as well as the imperialists laboured under singular delusions as to the status of foreign ambassadors. The following is the text of the reply from the official translation:—

Lin and *Lo*, honoured with the meritorious rank of earthly magistracy, holding the offices of first and second ministers of state of the second 34th Cong., 3d Sess., vol. 5; *Exec. Docs.*, No. 9, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 1.

¹ *Exec. Docs.*, No. 39, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 11.

class, promoted two degrees, send this mandatory despatch to Buchanan, of the United States of America, for his full information. Whereas the heavenly Father and the heavenly Elder Brother have greatly displayed their favour, and personally commanded our sovereign, the Celestial King, to come down and be the peaceful and true sovereign of the world, and have also sent the (five) kings to be assistants in the court and strong supports in the establishment of a flourishing government: now, therefore, when this city, the Celestial capital, has been established and built up by the sovereign authority of the heavenly Father and the heavenly Elder Brother, it is the very time that all nations should come and pay courtly honours, and all the four seas advance to receive instructions.

From you, Buchanan, there has been received a public document, in which a desire is expressed to come and see the Eastern King's golden face; but we, the ministers of state, on reading what is contained therein, find that you have presumed to employ terms used in correspondence between equals. This is not at all in conformity with what is right.

Because our Eastern King (may he live nine thousand years!) has respectfully received the Celestial commands to come into the world, and to be the assistant of the Celestial courts in drawing together the living souls of all nations (therefore), you, who reside on the ocean's borders and are alike imbued with favours, ought to come kneeling and make memorial, thus conforming to the principles of true submission, so as to show your sincerity in coming to pay court.

But we, the ministers of state, having examined this communication, have not submitted it to the golden glance of the Eastern King, lest we should excite the anger of the golden glance, and draw on ourselves no light criminality. Kindly keeping in mind, however, that you are residents on the ocean's borders, and have not known the rites and ceremonies of the Celestial court, indulgence (for the past) may be granted; but henceforth, as is right, you must conform to the established rules, and make respectful memorial.

With regard to the favour of the heavenly Father and heavenly Elder Brother, displayed in opening and awakening your minds so as to induce you to come and pay court to the true sovereign and to be near to the Celestial capital,—all this you have obtained as a manifestation of the grace of the heavenly Father and heavenly Elder Brother, and it is also your happiness.

The truly submissive, however, most assuredly will prepare rare, excellent, and precious things, and come and offer them in honour of the king, in this manner showing that you understand the mind of Heaven. Now, because the heavenly Father, the supreme Lord, the august High Ruler, is the only one true God, the Father of the souls of all nations under heaven; and Jesus, the Saviour of the world, the celestial Elder

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Brother, is the superior Elder Brother of all nations under heaven; and our sovereign, the Celestial King, is the peaceful and true sovereign of all nations under heaven: accordingly, therefore, all nations under heaven ought to reverence Heaven and obey the sovereign, knowing on whom it is they depend. We are indeed much afraid that you do not yet fully understand the things of Heaven, imagining that there are distinctions, as of this nation and that nation, not knowing the oneness of the true doctrine. Therefore we send this especial mandatory despatch.

If you indeed respect Heaven and recognise the sovereign, then our Celestial court, viewing all under heaven as one family and uniting all nations as one body, will most assuredly regard your faithful purpose, and permit you year by year to bring tribute and annually come to pay court, so that you may become the ministers and people of the Celestial kingdom, forever bathing yourselves in the gracious streams of the Celestial dynasty, peacefully residing in your own lands, and, living quietly, enjoy great glory. This is the sincere desire of us, the great ministers. Quickly ought you to conform to, and not to oppose this mandatory despatch.

24th day of the 4th month of the 4th year of the great peaceful Celestial dynasty. (Tuesday, May 30, 1854.)¹

In 1856 occurred the first clash of arms between the United States and China. On the 15th of November, 1856, a boat from the United States steamship *Portsmouth* was proceeding up to Canton from the anchorage, when fire was opened upon it from the barrier forts. At first the occupants of the boats believed that the Chinese were firing by mistake, and the American flag was exhibited in full view of the gunners. The fire, however, continued; and the boat was compelled to retire. James Armstrong, the commander-in-chief of the United States naval forces in the East Indian and China Seas, landed a body of men the next day, and captured the forts, from which the Chinese fled in confusion. He then wrote to Yeh, the imperial

¹ *Senate Exec. Docs.*, No. 22, 35th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 8, pp. 62, 63.

commissioner, demanding an explanation. His letter commenced, "I regret to have to notify your Excellency that it became my duty on the 16th inst. to assault and silence the works known as the 'Barrier Forts,' on the river between Whampoa and Canton."¹ So much did this prompt act of reprisal impress Yeh that in the final settlement of affairs nothing was said by the Chinese authorities in regard to the American assault and subsequent occupation of the forts.

Mr. McLane's efforts to conduct negotiations came to nothing, and in 1857 Mr. William B. Reed was appointed minister to China. On his arrival in the country he opened communication with Yeh, the imperial commissioner of Canton. At this time the country was in a very disturbed state; for, in addition to the activity of the Tae-ping rebels, the imperial authorities were engaged in hostilities with France and England. Mr. Reed finally succeeded in concluding a treaty on June 18, 1858, and two conventions on Nov. 3, 1858; but his correspondence in regard to these up to the time he resigned his post and returned to the United States, in December, 1858, fills a volume of more than six hundred pages.²

Two extracts from the communications received by Mr. Reed from Yeh, the imperial commissioner, may serve to show the difficulties in the way of getting anything done. One can hardly

¹ *Senate Exec. Docs.*, 35th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 9, p. 1029.

² *Ibid.*, No. 30, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 10, 624 pp.

read these extracts without feeling a hope that Yeh himself appreciated their humour. Mr. Reed, shortly after his arrival, wrote to Yeh, saying that he had come out with the object of revising the Treaty of Wanghia, 1844, in which the progress of events had necessitated certain alterations. He referred, with evident satisfaction, to the fact that the treaty had never been broken by the United States in any particular. To this Yeh replied, "If the treaty then settled [in 1844] has proved so very satisfactory and beneficial that your Excellency can say that it has never been broken, then there is no necessity of making even these slight modifications in it; and, intelligent and candid as you are, you must clearly see that the old regulations now in force require no alteration."¹ In reply to this Mr. Reed wrote: "I thank you for the friendly sentiments you express. They make me the more regret that you are unable to meet me, for I am sure a personal interview in which we could interchange opinions would convert the professed friendliness into some practical advantage to your countrymen and mine." To this the unspeakable Yeh answered: "In your communication you remark, 'I the more regret that you are unable to meet me,' etc. From this it is plainly to be perceived that your Excellency well understands the position of things, and the heartfelt regrets which you express have greatly tranquillised my feelings. In my previous reply there was not a word, not a sentence,

¹ *Senate Exec. Docs.*, No. 30, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 10, p. 51.

which did not express my real wishes and thoughts; and I have not changed since in any respect, nor was this professed friendliness on my part mere talk. Why, then, do you put so much stress on a transient interview, in order to render more certain the friendly feelings therein expressed? For instance, two persons who have some knowledge of each other may really entertain a hearty reciprocal liking, and look upon a letter from each other as good as a personal interview; while, if their friendliness is all pretence and they have no real hearty regard, though they should see each other continually, what avails it if their feelings are estranged as they look one another in the face? ”¹

However, after almost endless discussions,—which would no doubt have proved fruitless, had not the French and English forces compelled the imperial authorities to realise their position,—a new treaty between the United States and China was signed at Tientsin on June 18, 1858.² The treaty consisted of a preamble and thirty articles. As far as the interests of the United States were concerned, the treaty was a considerable advance on the treaty of 1844. The main points of difference to be noted are that the United States minister secured the right to communicate, on terms of equality, with the Chinese Privy Council and with certain high officials, and the right to visit Peking; whilst American missionaries were recognised in

¹ *Senate Exec. Docs.*, No. 30, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 10, p. 57.

² *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 12, pp. 1023-1030.

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Article 29, in the following terms: "The principles of the Christian religion, as professed by the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches, are recognised as teaching men to be good, and to do to others as they would have others do to them. Hereafter those who quietly profess and teach these doctrines shall not be harassed or persecuted on account of their faith. Any person, whether citizen of the United States or Chinese convert, who, according to their tenets, peaceably teach and preach the principles of Christianity, shall in no case be interfered with or molested."

In addition to the treaty of 1858, two conventions were signed between the United States and China in that year. The first related entirely to the regulation of trade, and was concluded at Shanghai on Nov. 8, 1858. The necessity for this convention arose from the fact that, by the treaty of 1858 (concluded June 18), it had been stipulated that the tariff of duties to be paid by American citizens should be the same as arranged by the treaty of Wanghia (1844), except so far as it might be modified by subsequent treaties with other Powers, and that in no case should the duties on American goods be higher than those levied on the goods of other nations. The recently concluded treaties with England and France, which terminated the war of 1856, had effected changes to which the assent of the United States government was desired; and concurrently a new tariff of duties was made, which superseded the tariff an-

nexed to the treaty of Wanghia, and perpetuated by the treaty of Tientsin.¹

The other convention with the United States was signed on the same day, Nov. 8, 1858, and gave effect to arrangements which had been entered into by Mr. Reed with the Chinese commissioners who signed the treaty of Tientsin in June, 1858, relating to the claims of American citizens against the Chinese government.

These claims, for the most part, arose through the action of Yeh, imperial commissioner and governor-general of Canton, who on the night of Dec. 14, 1856, wantonly destroyed all the foreign factories at Canton by fire. The claims were examined by Charles W. Bradley and Oliver E. Roberts, who were appointed commissioners for the purpose by President Buchanan. They reduced the claims from \$1,185,821 to \$414,187, the amount finally paid to claimants being \$492,734.²

The next step in the intercourse between the two countries carries us to the United States, where the centre of interest in regard to Chinese affairs remained for a number of years. In 1868 Mr. Anson Burlingame, who was minister of the United States to China, resigned his post and accepted a position under the Chinese government as envoy to the Powers,³ vested with authority to

¹ *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 12, pp. 1069-1080.

² Message of President Andrew Johnson, Feb. 18, 1868, transmitting information in regard to the execution of the convention of 1858 with China for the settlement of claims. *House Exec. Docs.*, No. 29, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., vol. 8, 212 pp.

³ *Senate Exec. Docs.*, No. 20, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 1.

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visit the United States and Europe, and to negotiate treaties. He arrived in Washington in the summer of 1868, and on June 18 of that year concluded with the United States a treaty containing supplementary articles to the treaty of 1858. This supplementary treaty is generally referred to as the "Burlingame treaty."

The treaty was important in many respects. Of the eight articles in the treaty, three only need be here noticed. By Article 3 the Emperor of China secured the right to appoint consuls at ports of the United States, who should enjoy the same privileges as those enjoyed by the consuls of Great Britain and Russia, in the United States. Articles 5 and 6 I quote, for it was in these articles that the United States formally recognised the right of the Chinese to enter the United States and reside there.

Article 5. "The United States of America and the Emperor of China cordially recognise the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects, respectively, from the one country to the other for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents." . . .

Article 6. "Citizens of the United States visiting or residing in China shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, or exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens of the most favoured nation. And, recipro-

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cally, Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favoured nation."¹

From this point we may date the problem of Chinese emigration to the United States. Before proceeding to a discussion of this question, it may be as well if we have before us a few figures relating to the subject.

NUMBER OF CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES.

Year.	Number in California.	Total Number in United States.
1848	3	3
✓ 1849	54	54
1850	789	789
1851	4,025	4,025
1852	18,040	18,040 ²
1853	34,933	34,893 ³
1860	49,277	63,199
1870	75,132	105,465
1880	72,472	107,475

The acceptance by the Senate of the Burlingame treaty, with its provisions encouraging Chinese immigration, is sufficient proof that in 1868 no general feeling against the Chinese existed in the country. Indeed, the very opposite was the case; for in 1862 there was presented to the California legislature a report from a select committee on

¹ *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 16, pp. 739-741.

² Up to and including 1852, the figures are taken from H. H. Bancroft's *History of the Pacific States of North America*, vol. xix., p. 336.

³ From 1860 on, the figures are taken from the United States Census Returns.

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the Chinese population of the State of California,¹ in which the following references to the Chinese occur: "a class of foreigners so peaceful, industrious, and useful," "a portion of Chinese with white labor would add incalculably to the resources of the State in this particular branch [grape culture]. It would also diminish drunkenness and consequent pauperism, thereby greatly diminishing crime and misery." "It is charged that the Chinese demoralise the whites. We cannot find any ground for the allegation. . . . They work for us: they help us build up our State by contributing largely to our taxes, to our shipping, farming, and mechanical interests, without, to any extent, entering these departments as competitors." "Instead of driving them out of the State, bounties might be offered them to cultivate tea, rice, etc."

From about 1870 there grew up an intense hostility to Chinamen on the Pacific Slope. This hostility found its expression in many forms. The Chinaman in California was heavily taxed. In the debates of the legislature he figured as an embodiment of all the crimes and vices. Those who sincerely believed him to be a menace to the State were scarcely outdone in their eloquence by those who found abuse of the Chinaman, in season and out of season, good electioneering in a State where the white labourer was a voter and the Chinese labourer was not.

¹ Report 23, in Appendix to Journals of the Senate and Assembly of the Legislature of the State of California, 1862.

Without doubt there were many people who held the honest conviction that the existence of the State, if not of the whole country, was imperilled by the presence of the Chinese and by the prospect that, in the absence of restrictions, an enormous flow of Mongolians would set in. The objections urged against the Chinese were, in the main, that they were willing to work for wages the acceptance of which by a white man would involve a serious lowering of the standard of living; that the savings of the Chinamen, instead of remaining in the country as part of its general wealth, were exported to China; that the Chinese were immoral in their habits; that they had no respect for an oath; that they were not assimilable, and formed an indigestible mass in the body politic; that they were largely drawn from the criminal classes; that they did not contribute to the support of the State; that the greater number of them were, in reality, slaves owned by the Chinese companies in San Francisco; and that there was no hope that they would ever become Americanised.

It is impossible to go over the very large official and unofficial literature of the subject without reaching the conclusion that the anti-Chinese statements are marked by a very strong tendency towards exaggeration. As an example of the unreasonableness of the alarmists, it may be recalled that a writer in the *Forum* in 1888 laid it as an offence at the door of the Chinese that their industry had enhanced the value of land in California. The form of argu-

ment was that the value of land had increased so much through the employment of Chinese labour that land owners were no longer willing to sell out to small farmers: hence, if the Chinaman had not worked on the land, the owners thereof would have been glad to sell, white men would then have bought the land in small lots, and the State would have been saved.¹

On behalf of the Chinaman it was urged that the fault of the low wage lay not in the Chinaman who accepted, but in the employer who offered it. No Chinaman had been known to refuse a high wage if he could get it. One ingenious Chinaman pointed out that, if the estimate made by the California legislature — that in a given year the Chinese in California had sent out of the country \$180,000,000 — were correct, it showed that each Chinaman had earned at least \$1,250, and inquired what became of the cheap labour argument.² But the strongest argument for the Chinaman, on other than legal grounds, was made by Dr. S. Wells Williams, the noted Chinese scholar, who had lived for many years in China. In an Address on Chinese Immigration, delivered before the American Social Science Association,³ he said in part: “Out of

¹ “Why the Chinese must be Excluded.” Willard B. Farwell. *Forum*, October, 1888. pp. 196-203.

² “The Chinese must Stay.” Yan Phou Lee. *North American Review*, April, 1889. pp. 476-483. This estimate was based on the extreme estimate of the number of Chinese in California, and allowed \$250 per annum as the living expense of a Chinaman.

³ *Journal of Social Science*, December, 1879, p. 18.

95,000 Chinese in California,¹ 198 were in State prison in 1877, while 347 whites were there. In twelve years 711 natives of Ireland were committed, and 750 natives of China; but the adult Irish population was only 35,000, or about one-third of the other. In the Industrial School were 4 Chinese among 225 others in the year 1875. In the almshouse, out of 498 inmates that year, not one Chinese, but 197 Irish. In the hospital report for 1875, out of 3,918 inmates, only 11 were Chinese and 308 Irish. In 1878, out of 3,007 admissions, 948 were Irish and 6 were Chinese. The arrests for drunkenness in San Francisco alone for the year ending June 30, 1878, were 6,127, not one of whom was a Chinese."

The Chinese were not without friends in the United States, amongst the most notable being General Grant, the Hon. George Frisbie Hoar and George F. Seward. During the course of his tour round the world, General Grant happened to touch at Georgetown, Pulo Penang, in the Malay Peninsula, in April, 1879. He was there presented with an address by the Chinese community, urging him to use his good offices in securing fair treatment of the Chinese in the United States. During his remarks in acknowledging the address, General Grant said that the hostility of which they complained did not represent the real sentiment of America, but was the work of demagogues who, in

¹It will be noticed that Dr. Williams accepted the exaggerated estimate of the number of the Chinese population of California current at that time.

that, as in other countries, pander to prejudice against race or nationality, and favour any measure of oppression that might advance their political interests. He never doubted, and no one could doubt, that in the end, no matter what effect the agitation for the time being might have, the American people would treat the Chinese with kindness and justice, and not deny to the free and deserving people of their country the asylum they offer to the rest of the world.¹

Senator Hoar, speaking in the Senate on March 1, 1882, on the Exclusion Act of 1882, concluded a brilliant speech by saying, "As surely as the path in which our fathers entered a hundred years ago led to safety, to strength, to glory, so surely will the path on which we now propose to enter bring us to shame, to weakness, and to peril."²

But popular detestation of the Chinese was so strong that at length anti-Chinese riots began to occur in various parts of the country. These culminated in the Chinese massacre at Rock Springs, Wyo., on the 2d of September, 1885. An indemnity of \$147,748 was paid by the government in respect of this outrage;³ but the Pacific Coast was aroused, and Chinese riots on a greater or less scale became frequent. On Nov. 7, 1885, and again on Feb. 9, 1886, President Cleveland issued proclamations ordering the dispersal of rioters;⁴

¹ *Journal of Social Science*, December, 1879, p. 91.

² *Congressional Record*, vol 13, part 2, pp. 1515-1522.

³ *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 24, p. 418.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1027, 1028.

but, although these energetic measures had a beneficial effect, they did not make the Chinamen more popular. The Chinese question in the United States now took on a new form. A practical question in regard to the welfare of the country arose, which required a practical solution. If all the arguments of the friends of the Chinese were admitted, the fact remained that, even if the fault were not theirs, their presence in the country was the occasion of constant disturbance of the peace.

A brief examination of the legislation in regard to the Chinese will serve to show how the difficulty was met.

Legislation in regard to Chinese immigration followed very closely the course of public sentiment. In 1868 the Burlingame treaty was passed, granting free entrance to any Chinamen who might wish to visit the country and also the right of permanent residence. In 1880 a treaty was concluded between the United States and China,¹ under the terms of which the United States was secured the power of regulating, limiting, or suspending the immigration of Chinese labourers if, at any time, the government should be convinced that the presence of such labourers threatened to affect the interests of the country or to endanger the good order of any locality; but it was expressly stipulated that any suspension of Chinese immigration should be temporary, and not final. On May 6, 1882, Congress, taking advantage of the rights secured by

¹ *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 22, pp. 826, 827.

the treaty of 1880, passed "An Act to execute Certain Treaty Stipulations relating to Chinese."¹ This Act provided that, after the expiration of ninety days from the passing of the Act and for a period of ten years following, the coming of Chinese labourers into the United States should be suspended. The law was not to apply to Chinese labourers who were in the United States on Nov. 17, 1880, or to any who might come in before the expiration of ninety days following the passage of the Act. Certificates were to be issued to all Chinamen entitled to exemption, which on presentation would procure their readmission to the country if at any time they should leave it.

On July 5, 1884, the Act of 1882 was re-enacted, with certain amendments, chiefly in regard to questions of identification and penalties.² On Sept. 13, 1888, an Act was passed absolutely prohibiting the return of any Chinese labourer to the United States unless he had in the country a lawful wife, child, or parent, or property to the value of \$1,000 or debts due him to a like amount.³ This Act never came into force, as, by the preamble, it was declared to take effect from the date of the ratification of the treaty of March 12, 1888, with China, which treaty was never ratified on account of the Senate making certain amendments in it which the Chinese government would not accept.

On Oct. 1, 1888, an Act was passed, supple-

¹ *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 22, pp. 58-61.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 23, pp. 115-118.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 25, pp. 476-479.

mentary to the Act of 1882, declaring that no certificate permitting return to the United States should be issued in the future, and that all certificates issued in the past were void, and that no Chinaman who had already left the country or should thereafter leave it should be allowed to return.¹

On May 5, 1892, Congress passed the famous Geary Act,—“An Act to prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons into the United States.” The provisions of this law were very strict. Previous exclusion laws were extended ten years from the passage of the Act. It was provided that any Chinese or person of Chinese descent was to be considered as being unlawfully in the United States unless he could, on demand, produce affirmative proof of his lawful right to remain in the country; and any such person, convicted of being unlawfully in the United States, was to be imprisoned at hard labour for a period not exceeding one year, and then to be removed from the country. All Chinese labourers in the country at the time of the passage of the Act were to apply to the collector of internal revenue in their respective districts, within one year of the passage of the Act, for a certificate of residence; and all Chinamen failing to do so were to be adjudged to be unlawfully in the United States, and were to be subject to the penalties attached to that condition.²

¹ *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 25, p. 504.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 27, pp. 25, 26.

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The above Act was amended on Nov. 3, 1893. The terms "labourer" and "merchant" were clearly defined; and it was provided that each applicant for a certificate of residence should provide the proper officer with a photograph of himself, in duplicate.¹

On March 17, 1894, a convention was concluded between the United States and China regarding the immigration into the former country of Chinese labourers. By the terms of this convention it was provided that, for ten years from date, Chinese labourers were absolutely prohibited from entering the United States, except such as were registered prior to the signing of the treaty, and who, having a lawful wife, child, or parent in the United States, or property valued at \$1,000, or debts due to that amount, should return within one year of the time they left the country.²

Finally, by the joint resolution of July 7, 1898, providing for the annexation of Hawaii, the exclusion laws of the United States were applied to that island.³

The enforcement of the exclusion laws kept the courts busy, and a number of appeals were taken to the United States Supreme Court from time to time. The views of the Supreme Court in regard to the effect and scope of the Geary Act may be gathered by reference to the decision in the case of *Fong Yue Ting, Wong Quan, and Lee Joe v.*

¹ *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 28, pp. 7, 8.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 1210-1212. ³ *Ibid.*, vol. 30, pp. 750, 751.

United States (149 U. S. Reports, 689). These cases were appeals from the decision of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, and arose in respect of proceedings to deport the appellants as being Chinese labourers unlawfully within the United States. After their arrest the Chinamen had instituted *habeas corpus* proceedings in the lower court. The judge refused to issue the writs, but granted leave to appeal from his decision.

The appeal was argued before the United States Supreme Court on May 10, 1893; and the decision was delivered on the 15th of the same month. Although the case went against the appellants, the decision was a close one,—four to three,—the dissenting judges being Chief Justice Fuller, Mr. Justice Brewer, and Mr. Justice Field. The decision of the Supreme Court on the law of the case (there was no issue of fact) included references to a number of similar cases, and enunciated these principles: that the right to expel or exclude aliens is inherent in every independent nation; that the power of expulsion and exclusion is a political, not a judicial power; that, in passing on the constitutionality of any law, the Supreme Court was not called on to take cognisance of treaties with foreign powers, the only point for its decision being whether Congress framed the Act in the exercise of its constitutional authority; that, the Acts restricting Chinese immigration having been declared constitutional by the Supreme Court on the occa-

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sion of former appeals, it could not be held that any of the earlier treaties had given Chinese labourers any rights to remain in the country except by the license, permission, and sufferance of Congress, to be withdrawn whenever in its opinion the public welfare might require it. To put the matter in a nutshell, the decision amounted to this: that Congress, acting in its legislative capacity, might at any time deprive alien residents of any rights which had been granted by the same body, acting in its capacity as a treaty-making body, as a matter of agreement with a foreign government.

The three dissenting justices based their opinions, for the most part, on these considerations: that, as the appellants had entered the United States under the terms of the treaty of 1868, they could not by a mere legislative Act be deprived of the rights secured them by the treaty; that, as deportation was a form of punishment, it could not be inflicted except after trial and conviction; that, although the power to exclude foreigners had frequently been asserted, the power to expel persons already within the country had never been claimed; that, even if such a right existed, the power could not be used against men to whom the privilege of residence had been expressly extended by treaty; and that the decision of the court gave an *ex-post-facto* application to the act of 1892. Mr. Justice Field said in his opinion: "The moment any human being from a country at peace with us comes within the jurisdiction of the United States, with

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their consent,—and such consent will always be implied when not expressly withheld, and in the case of the Chinese labourers before us was in terms given them by the treaty referred to,¹—he becomes subject to all their laws, is amenable to their punishment, and entitled to their protection. Arbitrary and despotic power can no more be exercised over them with reference to their persons and property than over the persons and property of native-born citizens. They differ only from citizens in that they cannot vote or hold any public office. As men having our common humanity, they are protected by all the guarantees of the Constitution. To hold that they are subject to any different law or are less protected in any particular than other persons is, in my judgment, to ignore the teachings of our history, the practice of our government, and the language of the Constitution.”

The final adjustment of the Chinese question in the United States left nothing between the two countries but their trade. The interest of the United States in China from 1893 onward has

¹It should not be overlooked that, when the negotiations were entered into with the Chinese government which ended in the treaty of Nov. 17, 1880 (under the terms of which the United States reserved the right to “regulate, limit, or suspend Chinese immigration”), the American commissioners informed the Chinese government that, “as far as those [Chinese labourers] are concerned who under treaty guarantee have come to the United States, the government recognises but one duty; and that is to maintain them in the exercise of their treaty privileges against any opposition, whether it takes the shape of popular violence or legislative enactment.” *Exec. Docs.*, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 1, p. 173.

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centred round the question of the "open door," and the action of the country in this connection is discussed in the chapter on "The Conflicting Interests and Ambitions of the Powers in China."

Chapter IV.

ENGLAND AND CHINA.

Queen Elizabeth was the first English monarch who attempted to open up direct communication with the Chinese Court. In 1596 she fitted out three ships for the China voyage, and gave the master, Benjamin Wood, letters to the Emperor of China.¹ The ships were lost on the voyage, and the project was not renewed. In 1635 four English ships, under command of Captain Weddell, arrived at the Portuguese settlement of Macao below Canton. This intrusion of the English became a matter of serious concern to the Portuguese, whose commercial monopoly was thus threatened; and every effort was made to drive the new-comers away. The means adopted by the Portuguese to secure this end, and how they served, are set forth by Captain Weddell in his narrative of the voyage.² " . . . And the English ships rode with their white ensigns on the poop; but their perfidious friends, the Portugalls, had in all that time, since the return of the pin-nace, so beslandered them to the Chinese, reporting them to be rogues, thieves, beggars, and what not, that they became very jealous of the good meaning of the English; insomuch that, in the

¹ *China*, by Sir John Francis Davis, new edition (London, 1857), p. 33.

² *An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China*, by Sir George Staunton, new edition, 2 vols. (Dublin, 1878), vol. i. pp. 7 and 8.

night time, they put forty-six of iron cast ordnance into the fort lying close to the brink of the river; each piece between six and seven hundred weight, and well proportioned; and after the end of four days, having, as they thought, sufficiently fortified themselves, they discharged divers shot, though without hurt, upon one of the barges passing by them to find out a convenient watering place. Herewith the whole fleet, being instantly incensed, did on the sudden display their bloody ensigns; and weighing their anchors fell up with the flood, and berthed themselves before the castle, from whence came many shot; yet not any that touched so much as hull or rope; whereupon, not being able to endure their bravadoes any longer, each ship began to play furiously upon them, with their broadsides; and after two or three hours, perceiving their cowardly fainting, the boats were landed with about one hundred men; which fight occasioned them, with great distractions, instantly to abandon the castle and fly; the boats' crews in the meantime, without let, entering the same, and displaying His Majesty's colours of Great Britain upon the walls, having, the same night, put aboard all their ordnance, fired the council-house, and demolished what they could."

This was the first encounter between British and Chinese soldiers; and it resulted, as each encounter has resulted since that time, in the granting of simple trading privileges previously refused to respectful petition.

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For one hundred and fifty years the trade with China was conducted under great difficulties. Attempts were made by the English East India Company to open intercourse at Ningpo, Fuhchau, and Amoy, but without success; and Canton remained the only "open" port of China, if such a term may be applied to a place where the trade could be conducted only under the most rigid and absurd regulations, and with but a half-dozen merchants appointed by the government for that purpose.¹

Notwithstanding the cumbersome methods of the port, the trade of Canton steadily grew in importance; and in 1788 Colonel Cathcart was sent out from England as ambassador to China. His death on the voyage out put an end to the project, which was not renewed until 1792. In that year Lord Macartney carried a letter from George III. to the Emperor of China. Although he succeeded in obtaining an audience, and that without submitting to the degrading ceremony of kowtow,² hitherto insisted upon in interviews with the emperor, the mission resulted in little real advantage to the interests of England in China. It was discovered, after the embassy had returned to the

¹ For an account of the early methods of trade at Canton, consult *Remarks on China and the China Trade*, by R. B. Forbes. Boston, 1844.

² For an account of the ceremonial to be observed at the Court of China by foreign ambassadors, see *Histoire des Relations Politiques de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales. . . . Suivie du Cérémonial observé à la Cour de Pe-king pour la Réception des Ambassadeurs*, by G. Pauthier. Paris, 1859.

coast, that the banners carried before the ambassador on his way to Peking had borne the legend, "Tribute Bearers,"—a precaution taken by the Chinese authorities to prevent the populace learning that diplomatic intercourse had been opened with the "barbarians."¹

The reply sent by the Emperor to George III. serves not only to show the utter futility of the first British embassy, but to convince us that, even in the absence of specific grievances, an attitude of mind so intolerable as that exhibited in the letter would have been sufficient to account for all the foreign wars in which China has engaged from that day to this.

This letter, which bears the superscription, "An Imperial Order to the King of England," has been translated from the *Tung-hwa Luh*, or Published Court Record of the Manchu Dynasty, by Mr. E. H. Parker; and from this source I make the following extracts: "So then, thou King, far away over many oceans, thou hast inclined thine heart towards civilisation, and hast made a point of despatching envoys to respectfully bear a submissive address. . . . As to the earnest prayer in thine address, King, that thou mayest despatch a man of thine own nationality to reside at the Celestial Court and take the management of the commercial interests of thy kingdom, this is quite contrary to

¹ Lord Macartney's mission is described in *An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China*, by Sir George Staunton. 2 vols. Dublin, 1798.

the policy of the Celestial Court, and positively cannot be allowed. . . . Thou art thus clearly notified of our pleasure, and thine envoys are hereby dismissed and commanded to betake themselves by comfortable stages back to their country. And thou, King, thou shouldst do thy best to realise our imperial meaning, making still further efforts to prove thy loyalty, and forever strive to be respectful and submissive, so as to preserve to thy kingdom its due share of the blessings of peace."

A further command runs: "Thou King, having yearned from a distance for the civilising influence, and having most earnestly inclined thyself towards improvement, hast despatched envoys to reverently bear with them an address and tribute, to cross the sea and pray for our happiness. . . . The other day thine envoys raised the question of thy kingdom's commerce, and petitioned our ministers to bring the matter before us. It all involves tampering with fixed rules, and is inexpedient to accord. Hitherto the barbarian ships of the different European states and of thine own kingdom, coming to trade at the Celestial Court, have always conducted their trade at Macao.¹ The stores of goods at the Celestial Court are plenteously abundant. There is nothing but what is possessed, so that there is really no need for the produce of outer barbarians in order to balance supply and demand. However, as the tea, silk, and porcelain produced by the

¹ For an account of Macao, see *An Historical Sketch of the Portuguese Settlements in China*, by A. Ljungstedt. Boston, 1836.

Celestial Court are indispensable objects to the different States of Europe and to thy kingdom, for this reason we have, in our grace and commiseration, established the foreign hong^s at Macao, in order that all daily needs may be duly supplied, and every one share in our superfluous riches. But now thine envoys have made considerable demands over and above what is provided by fixed precedent, in such wise as to run seriously counter to the principle of recognising the bounty of the Celestial Court to distant men, and its ministering care of the different barbarians. Moreover, the Celestial Court exercises a controlling supervision over all countries. . . . The boundaries of the Celestial Court are defined with absolute clearness, and never have individuals belonging to outer dependencies been allowed to infringe the frontiers or mix with our people in the least degree. Thus the desire of thy kingdom to set up a hong in the metropolitan city cannot be granted. . . . As to the teaching of the Lord of Heaven, cultivated by thy kingdom, this is simply the teaching which has, up to this time, been cultivated by the different nations of Europe. The sacred emperors and illustrious kings of the Celestial Court have, ever since the creation of the world, handed down the teachings which they have instituted from time to time. The earth's millions have a standing guide provided for them to follow herein, and would not befool themselves with outlandish doctrines. . . . The Celestial

¹ Stores or warehouses.

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Court holds in conciliatory possession all the States of the world. . . . Tremble and obey, without further negligence, this further command!"¹

In 1816 another British embassy was despatched to China; but audience of the Emperor was refused because Lord Amherst, the Ambassador, declined to perform the kowtow, and for other reasons, and the embassy accomplished nothing.² "Its real failure," says Dr. Williams, "was owing to the utter misconception of their true position by the Emperor and his officials, arising from their ignorance, pride, isolation, and mendacity, all combining to keep them so until resistless force should open them to meliorating influences. It was the last attempt of the kind; and three alternatives only remained,—the resort to force to compel them to enter into some equitable arrangement, entire submission to whatever they ordered, or the withdrawal of all trade until they proposed its resumption. The course of events continued the second until the first was resorted to, and eventuated in laying open the whole coast to the enterprise of Western nations."³

In order to carry our narrative to the point where the British government first came into contact with the Chinese government in the conduct of practi-

¹ "From the Emperor of China to King George III.," *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1896, p. 45.

² For an account of Lord Amherst's embassy, see *Journal of the Late Embassy to China*, by Henry Ellis, Third Commissioner of the Embassy. Philadelphia, 1818.

³ *A History of China*, by S. Wells Williams (New York, 1897), p. 107.

cal affairs, it is necessary to glance for a moment at the changes effected in the early part of the nineteenth century in the charter of the English East India Company, a corporation which for more than two centuries held the East Indian and China trade as a monopoly, and which up to 1834 conducted all business transactions with the Chinese authorities.

On July 21, 1813, Parliament passed an "Act . . . for regulating the trade to and from the places within the limits of the said Company's Charter."¹ By this Act the trade monopoly of the Company was abolished, except in so far as its trade with China was concerned, from April 10, 1814. Ten years later, in 1823, the charter was renewed, the Company still retaining the monopoly of the China trade.² In 1832 a Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to inquire into the affairs of the Company; and this Committee issued in the same year a long report, covering about 5,000 folio pages.³ On Aug. 28, 1833, an Act was passed which, whilst it continued the general powers of the Company until April 30, 1854 (on which day the Company passed out of existence), provided for the throwing open of the China trade from April 22, 1834.⁴ On the same day, Aug. 28, 1833, a further Act was passed, providing for the regulation of the China and India trade from

¹ 53 George III., cap. 155.

² 4 George IV., cap. 80.

³ The Report fills 7 vols., Nos. 8-14, of the *Sessional Papers* for 1831-32.

⁴ 3 and 4 William IV., cap. 85.

the time when it passed from the control of the East India Company.¹ By this Act, His Majesty was empowered to appoint three superintendents to reside in China and regulate British trade in that region. Lord Napier was appointed chief superintendent, with Mr. (afterwards Sir John Francis) Davis and Sir George Robinson as assistants. On his arrival at Canton, Lord Napier attempted to announce his mission to the Chinese authorities; but they would have nothing to do with him. His baggage was seized, he was subjected to great indignities, and was finally compelled to retire to Macao, where he died on Oct. 11, 1834.²

Lord Napier was succeeded by Sir George Robinson, who, in turn, was replaced by Captain (afterwards Sir Charles) Elliot. Under the charge of these officials the trade of Canton prospered for a while, although the refusal of the mandarin to have any direct dealings with the British representative made everything very difficult and kept affairs at high tension.

But trouble was ahead. From the abolition of the monopoly in 1834 up to the outbreak of war between England and China in 1840 the record is made up of the perpetual attempts of the foreign merchants to secure tolerable conditions for their trade and of the continual refusals of the Chinese authorities to consider the foreigners in any other

¹ 3 and 4 William IV., cap. 93.

² Lord Napier's despatches and a mass of other matter relating to Chinese affairs from 1834-1839 are to be found in volume 36 of the *Sessional Papers* for 1840.

light than as barbarians. The immediate cause of the outbreak was the action of Lin, the Imperial Commissioner, who, under the pretext of investigating the opium trade known to exist at Canton (with the connivance and active aid of the Chinese authorities), imprisoned the whole foreign community, including Sir Charles Elliot, Her Majesty's representative, — a captivity which lasted six weeks. During their captivity the foreign merchants, acting under the order of Captain Elliot and under threat of death by the Chinese authorities, gave up all the opium in their possession. The whole of this, some 20,000 chests, was destroyed by Lin.

The insults to Her Majesty's representative and the outrage upon the foreign community, added to the constant threats of violence on the part of the Chinese, in some instances carried into effect, led, late in 1839, to the outbreak of hostilities.

The war lasted nearly three years, and was brought to a close after the British troops had captured a number of towns and had defeated the Chinese in many engagements, by the treaty of Nanking, signed on Aug. 29, 1842, on board H. M. S. *Cornwallis*, off Nanking, by Sir Henry Pottinger, and by Keying, the Chinese High Commissioner, and two other Chinese officials.¹

This war has been called "the opium war" from the important part played by that drug in the discussions which preceded hostilities. In addition to

¹ See *China during the War and since the Peace*, by Sir John Francis Davis. 2 vols. London, 1852.

the very large official literature of the subject,¹ there is a considerable collection of books and pamphlets by private individuals.²

The plain facts appear to have been that according to Imperial decrees the opium trade was illegal, but that the local authorities at Canton encouraged the smuggling of the drug. It was asserted by credible witnesses that the Viceroy of Kwangtung, in which province Canton is situated, had four boats flying his flag engaged in the trade.³ Edicts were issued from time to time, condemning the use of the drug; but no serious efforts were made by the Chinese authorities to stop the smuggling until the drain of silver in payment for the opium so advanced the rate of exchange for copper cash⁴ that Lin was sent to Canton to investigate.

The British superintendent of trade at Canton was undoubtedly aware of the contraband trade which was going on; but he felt that, if the highest local authorities did not scruple to engage in the trade, it was not his business to interfere, the more so as these very authorities refused to recognise his official standing, in consideration of which alone he would have been able to restrain the merchants.

¹ See *Sessional Papers*, 1840, vols. 7 and 36; 1841, vol. 14; 1842, vols. 26 and 27; 1843, vols. 1, 30, 31, and 35.

² See Bibliographical Appendix, *China and England*,—"War of 1840."

³ Report of the Select Committee on the Trade with China, *Sessional Papers* of 1840, vol. 7, No. 359, pp. 51, 52, and 95.

⁴ The usual rate was 1,000 cash to 1 tael silver; but the export of silver had raised the exchange to 16,000 to 1.

So it amounted to this; that both sides knew the trade was illegal; both sides winked at it (the Chinese officials, moreover, making a handsome income out of it, on the one hand by engaging in the trade, on the other by accepting bribes to allow others to do so); that the Chinese put themselves in the wrong by their disregard of their own edicts and by the violent and unjustifiable methods they adopted, when, under pressure from the Peking officials, they finally decided to stop the trade; and that the English were to blame, in the first instance, for being party to the dishonesty of the local officials, and in the second instance, and far more gravely, for insisting on an indemnity being paid for the opium which Lin had destroyed at Canton.

But wars have to be considered, not only in regard to their causes, but also in regard to their effects. "There are many kinds of wars," says Von Ranke,¹ "and many degrees of heroic renown; but the highest praise is due to those who, by their victorious arms, have opened new scenes for the civilisation of mankind, and overcome barbarism in some important portion of the world." So, whilst we may portion out blame for the war of 1840 according to our particular views, it is a very practical thing to observe the consequences of the war as far as they affected the general condition of the world.

By the Treaty of Nanking, 1842,² and by the

¹ *Civil Wars and Monarchy in France*, by Leopold von Ranke (New York, 1853), p. 13.

² *Sessional Papers*, 1844, vol. 51, No. 521.

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Supplementary Treaty of Hoomun-Chae, 1842¹ the vexatious restrictions on foreign trade at Canton were removed; the Co Hong² was abolished; merchants were given the right to trade freely with all; the four ports of Amoy, Ningpo, Fuhchau, and Shanghai, were thrown open to foreign trade (England claimed no exclusive privileges); and, by securing the right of communication on terms of equality with high Chinese officials, England struck the first effective blow at that arrogant and intolerable attitude towards foreigners by which—to quote a writer strongly opposed to England's general policy in China at that time—"the Chinese government brought upon itself all the evils of the opium trade and the consequent wars."³ As far as England's actual material gain by the war was concerned, she obtained the cession of Hongkong, which she had captured during hostilities, and an indemnity of \$21,000,000, of which \$6,000,000 represented the value of the opium destroyed by Lin.

Although there was the usual outcry, both on the Continent and in the United States, about the iniquity of the British government in going to war with China, each nation hastened to claim for itself the advantages secured to the world at large by the British victories. The United States and

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1844, vol. 51, No. 534.

² The collective title of the few Chinese merchants permitted to trade with foreigners.

³ *British Opium Policy and its Results in India and China*, by F. S. Turner. London, 1876.

France sent out commissioners at once; and each country concluded a treaty with China, securing to itself those privileges which, had it not been for the perfidious Briton, China would have certainly withheld for many years. Belgium, Spain, Holland, Prussia, and Portugal also took advantage of the new order of things to send out representatives.

We may dismiss the question of the war by quoting two concise opinions expressed by two distinguished Americans, John Quincy Adams, at one time President of the United States, and Dr. S. Wells Williams, one of the most learned sinologues of his time. Mr. Adams, in an address before the Massachusetts Historical Society, Nov. 22, 1841, on the subject of "The War between England and China," said: "The justice of the cause between the two parties,—which has the righteous cause? You have perhaps been surprised to hear me answer, Britain. Britain has the righteous cause. But, to prove it, I have been obliged to show that the opium question is not the cause of the war. My demonstration is not yet complete. The cause of the war is the kowtow!—the arrogant and insupportable pretensions of China that she will hold commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind, not upon terms of equal reciprocity, but upon the insulting and degrading forms of lord and vassal."¹

Dr. Williams, whose knowledge of Chinese affairs was unsurpassed by that of any man of his time,

¹ Boston *Evening Transcript*, Wednesday, Nov. 24, 1841. The address may be found in full in the *Chinese Repository*, vol. xi. pp. 274-289.

sums up the war in these words: "The war, though eminently unjust in its cause as an opium war, . . . was still, as far as human sagacity can perceive, a wholesome infliction upon a government which haughtily refused all equal intercourse with other nations, or explanations regarding its conduct, and forbade its subjects having free dealings with their fellow-men. If, in entering upon the conflict, England had published to the world her declaration of the reasons for engaging in it, the merits of the case would have been better understood. If she had said at the outset that she commenced the struggle with the Emperor because he would not treat her subjects resorting to her shores by his permission with common humanity, allowing them no intercourse with his subjects nor access to his officers; because he contemptuously discarded her ambassadors and consular agents, sent with friendly design; because he made foolish regulations (which his own subjects did not observe) an occasion of offence against others when it suited him, and had despoiled them of their property by strange and arbitrary proceedings, weakening all confidence in his equity; lastly, because he kept himself aloof from other sovereigns, and shut out his people from that intercourse with their fellow-men which was their privilege and right,—her character in this war would have appeared far better."

It may be profitable if, at this point, we have before us a few figures showing the growth of British trade with China from the signing of the

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Treaty of Nanking down to the present time. As all sums below £1,000 are omitted, a calculation at \$5 to the pound will give a close approximation in United States currency.

IMPORTS FROM CHINA AND HONGKONG.			EXPORTS OF DOMESTIC PRODUCE TO CHINA AND HONGKONG.		
In thousands of pounds sterling.			In thousands of pounds sterling.		
		<i>Total.</i>			<i>Total.</i>
1845	{ China, } { Hongkong, }		1845	{ China, 855 } { Hongkong, 1,539 }	2,394
1850	{ China, } { Hongkong, }		1850	{ China, 976 } { Hongkong, 598 }	1,574
1855	{ China, } { Hongkong, }	8,746	1855	{ China, 889 } { Hongkong, 389 }	1,278
1860	{ China, } { Hongkong, }	9,324	1860	{ China, 2,872 } { Hongkong, 2,445 }	5,317
1865	{ China, 10,678 } { Hongkong, 773 }	11,451	1865	{ China, 3,603 } { Hongkong, 1,549 }	5,152
1870	{ China, 9,624 } { Hongkong, 281 }	9,905	1870	{ China, 6,139 } { Hongkong, 3,408 }	9,547
1875	{ China, 13,655 } { Hongkong, 1,155 }	14,810	1875	{ China, 4,928 } { Hongkong, 3,600 }	8,528
1880	{ China, 11,834 } { Hongkong, 1,253 }	13,087	1880	{ China, 5,064 } { Hongkong, 3,778 }	8,842
1885	{ China, 8,614 } { Hongkong, 968 }	9,582	1885	{ China, 5,187 } { Hongkong, 3,757 }	8,944
1890	{ China, 4,830 } { Hongkong, 1,225 }	6,005	1890	{ China, 6,609 } { Hongkong, 2,528 }	9,137
1895	{ China, 3,343 } { Hongkong, 759 }	4,102	1895	{ China, 5,257 } { Hongkong, 1,909 }	7,166
1896	{ China, 2,973 } { Hongkong, 797 }	3,770	1896	{ China, 6,717 } { Hongkong, 1,822 }	8,539
1897	{ China, 2,684 } { Hongkong, 606 }	3,290	1897	{ China, 5,142 } { Hongkong, 1,975 }	7,117
1898	{ China, 2,668 } { Hongkong, 724 }	3,392	1898	{ China, 5,044 } { Hongkong, 2,224 }	7,268
1899	{ China, 3,079 } { Hongkong, 884 }	3,963	1899	{ China, 7,035 } { Hongkong, 2,690 }	9,725

The signing of the Treaty of Nanking marked the commencement of a new era in China. But, as the impression created by the hostilities wore off, the Chinese showed themselves to be still

bitterly opposed to intercourse with foreigners; and great difficulty was experienced in securing the performance of the treaty obligations.

As time passed, relations between the two countries became strained. A number of Englishmen were murdered near Canton; the foreign settlement at Shanghai was attacked; Chinese pirates became a serious menace to the merchant fleet; and the local authorities at Canton refused to open the city to foreigners according to the treaty agreement.¹

Matters came to a head at Canton on Oct. 8, 1856, when a party of Chinamen from a Chinese war junk boarded a small vessel called the *Arrow*, having a British register and flying the British flag, and carried off the Chinese crew. After some correspondence with Yeh, the Imperial Commissioner, who refused to apologise for the action of his officials in hauling down the British flag on the *Arrow*, hostilities were commenced and a condition of local war was established. The British forces captured the forts surrounding Canton; and Yeh retaliated by burning down all the foreign factories, by offering a bounty of thirty

¹ Papers relating to the Riot at Canton, 1846, *Sessional Papers*, 1847, vol. 40, No. 808. Papers relating to the Murder of Six Englishmen in the Neighbourhood of Canton, *Sessional Papers*, 1847-48, vol. 48, No. 930. Further Papers on the Same Subject, *Sessional Papers*, 1847-48, vol. 48, No. 947. Correspondence respecting the Attack on the Foreign Settlements at Shanghai, *Sessional Papers*, 1854, vol. 72, No. 1792. Correspondence between the Foreign Office and the Commercial Association of Manchester relative to Outrages committed on British Subjects in China in 1846, 1847, and 1848, *Sessional Papers*, 1857 (2d Session), vol. 43, No. 2220.

taels for the head of each Englishman killed or captured, and by attempting, through the agency of a local baker, to poison the whole foreign community at Hongkong by the introduction of arsenic into the bread.¹

In December, 1856, a pause occurred in the hostilities; for the British admiral, Sir Michael Seymour, had sent home to England for five thousand troops, and until their arrival no formal investment of Canton could be undertaken.

The British government, moved by a desire to effect a permanent settlement of outstanding questions, decided to send out with the army an ambassador equipped with full powers to negotiate a treaty with the Peking authorities. To this important post the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine was appointed in April, 1857. His instructions from Lord Clarendon were explicit.² In part, they were as follows:—

“If the Emperor of China should name a plenipotentiary to treat with you, and negotiations should accordingly be entered into, Your Excellency will have to provide for the following points.

¹ Papers relating to the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton, *Sessional Papers*, 1857 (2d Session), vol. 43, Nos. 2206, 2223, and 2276. Correspondence with the Chinese Commissioner Yeh, *Sessional Papers*, 1857-58, vol. 60, No. 2322. Papers connected with the Confinement of Chinese Prisoners at Hongkong, and with the Trial of a Baker and Others on the Charge of Poisoning, *Sessional Papers*, 1857, vol. 43, No. 155.

² Correspondence relative to the Earl of Elgin's Special Missions to China and Japan, 1857-59, *Sessional Papers*, 1859, vol. 33, No. 2571, pp. 1-7.

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“... For reparations of injuries to British subjects; for the complete execution at Canton, as well as at the other ports, of the stipulations of the several treaties; compensation to British subjects and persons entitled to British protection for losses incurred in consequence of the late disturbances; the assent of the Chinese government to the residence at Peking, or to the occasional visit to that capital, at the option of the British government, of a minister duly accredited by the Queen to the Emperor of China, and the recognition of the right of the British plenipotentiary and chief superintendent of trade to communicate directly in writing with the high officers at the Chinese capital and to send his communications by messengers of his own selection,—such arrangements affording the best means of insuring the due execution of the existing treaties, and of preventing future misunderstandings; a revision of the treaties with China with a view to obtaining increased facilities for commerce, such as access to cities on the great rivers, as well as to Chapoo and to other ports on the coast, and also permission for Chinese vessels to resort to Hong-kong for purposes of trade from all ports of the Chinese Empire without distinction.

“If the Chinese government should agree to the first three demands, Your Excellency will still endeavour to procure, by negotiation, the last two points; but, if they should refuse to enter into any negotiation, or should not agree to all the three

demands first specified, Your Excellency will be justified in having recourse at once to coercive measures.

“Your Excellency is so well aware of the principles by which Her Majesty’s government are actuated that I need not press upon you the necessity of bearing in mind that Her Majesty’s government have no desire to obtain any exclusive advantages for British trade in China, but are only desirous to share with all other nations any benefits which they may acquire in the first instance specifically for British commerce.”

Lord Elgin left England in May, 1857, and arrived at Singapore on June 3 of the same year. Here he found a letter from Lord Canning, governor-general of India, apprising him of the outbreak of the Indian mutiny, and imploring him to divert to Calcutta the troops intended for the China expedition. Under these circumstances, Lord Elgin acted with promptitude and decision. Not only did he at once despatch to India such portion of the China Expeditionary Force as had arrived at Singapore, but, on reaching Hongkong and receiving there news of the spread of the mutiny, he gathered together all available forces, and, abandoning for the time his China mission, set out for Calcutta, where he arrived on Aug. 8, 1857, in time to exert a most beneficial influence on the state of affairs in Lower Bengal. Lord Elgin left Calcutta again on Sept. 3, 1857, and arrived at Hongkong on the 20th of the same month. On the 16th of October, Baron

Gros, the French plenipotentiary (for France also had a score to settle with China on account of the murder of Père Chapdelaine, who was tortured and beheaded in 1856), arrived, and, after a conference with Lord Elgin, took up his anchorage a few miles from Hongkong.

On Dec. 12, 1857, Lord Elgin sent an ultimatum to Yeh, the Imperial Commissioner,¹ demanding the complete execution at Canton of all treaty engagements, and compensation to British subjects and persons entitled to British protection for losses incurred during the recent disturbances. Ten days were allowed Yeh in which to make up his mind, and subsequently a further delay of five days occurred. So it was not until Dec. 28, 1857, that the allied squadron of England and France, in view of the continued refusal of Yeh to come to terms, commenced the bombardment of Canton. The city was captured the following day, and Yeh was taken prisoner.²

In the mean time there had arrived at Canton William B. Reed, United States Minister to China, and Count Putiatine, the Russian Plenipotentiary. The object of the former was to secure a revision of the Treaty of Wanghia and to obtain compensation for the losses sustained by American citizens when Yeh burned down the foreign honghs. Count Putiatine, who had been most discourteously used the previous year at the mouth of the Peiho,

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1859 (2d Session), vol. 33, No. 2571, pp. 95, and 96.

² He was sent to Calcutta as a prisoner of State.

desired to settle a boundary dispute and to obtain redress for the burning and pillage of a Russian factory at Tarbagatae.

The opportunity seemed favourable for joint action; and accordingly the Plenipotentiaries of England, the United States, France, and Russia, forwarded notes of a similar tenor to the Imperial authorities.¹

There was nothing in these letters which need have caused the slightest uneasiness in the minds of the Imperial authorities. The demands, which were couched in firm but respectful language, followed the general line of compensation for past injuries, fair trade arrangements, access to the high officials of the Empire, the fulfilment of the existing treaty pledges, and freedom of conscience for Christian converts.

The tortuous workings of the Chinese system, as well as the utter uselessness of attempting to achieve any results by diplomatic representation alone, are clearly to be gathered from the reply which Lord Elgin received from Yu, the secretary of state at Peking.² Lord Elgin had forwarded his letter to Yu through the medium of Ho, the Governor-General of the Two Kwang, and Chau, the governor of Kwang-su.

Yu does not condescend to answer Lord Elgin's

¹ The four notes are to be found in *U.S. Senate Exec. Docs.*, No. 30, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. The English note, pp. 134-136. The United States note, pp. 171-175. The French note, pp. 164-168. The Russian note, pp. 177-179.

² *Sessional Papers*, 1859 (2d Session), vol. 33, No. 2571, pp. 241, 242.

communication, but writes to Ho and Chau: "I have perused the letter received, and have acquainted myself with all it relates to. . . . His Majesty the Emperor is magnanimous and considerate. He has been pleased, by a decree which we have had the honour to receive, to degrade Yeh from the governor-generalship of the Two Kwang for his mal-administration, and to despatch his Excellency Hwang to Kwang-Tung¹ as Imperial Commissioner in his stead, to investigate and decide with impartiality; and it will of course behooove the English minister to wait in Kwang-Tung, and there make his arrangements. No Imperial Commissioner ever conducts business at Shanghai. There being a particular sphere of duty allotted to every official on the establishment of the Celestial Empire, and the principle that between them and the foreigner there is no intercourse² being one ever rigidly adhered to by the servants of our government of China, it would not be proper for me to reply in person to the letter of the English minister. Let your Excellencies, therefore, transmit to him all that I have said above."

It was decided, after the receipt of this communication, that the best course for the plenipotentiaries was to go north to the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, where, within striking distance of Peking, communication with the Imperial authorities could be advantage-

¹ The province of which Canton is the capital.

² Yu apparently ignored the eleventh article of the Treaty of Nanking, which provided for official intercourse with the high Chinese officials.

ously reopened. In accordance with this policy the four ministers repaired to the mouth of the Peiho; and by the end of April, 1858, negotiations were under way once more.

But here again every obstacle was placed by the Chinese authorities in the way of a definite settlement; and, finally, after a month spent in useless discussion, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros decided that, unless they were nearer to Peking, nothing would come of their efforts. But, on attempting to pass up the river to Tientsin, the Taku forts opened fire on the allied squadron. The fire was returned; and after a few hours' fighting the forts were captured on May 20, 1858.

Ten days later Lord Elgin and the other plenipotentiaries entered Tientsin, there to await the arrival of Chinese commissioners equipped with full power to treat. These presently appeared in the persons of Kweiliang and Hwashana, who were authorised by the Imperial authorities to hear what the barbarians had to say, and to conclude such arrangements as were necessary in the circumstances. By the end of June, 1858, the four treaties were signed, but only after every device had been exhausted by the Chinese to avoid binding engagements. In general tenor the treaties were much the same.¹ The English treaty, signed at Tientsin on June 26, 1858, consisted of fifty-six articles, with

¹ The English Treaty, *British Sessional Papers*, 1859, vol. 33, pp. 347-355. The American Treaty, *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 12, pp. 1023-1030. The Russian Treaty, *U.S. Senate Exec. Docs.*, No. 30, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 10, pp. 387-391. The French Treaty, *Ibid.*, pp. 395-409.

a supplementary unnumbered article providing for the payment by China of an indemnity of four million taels, two million on account of losses sustained by British subjects at Canton and two million for the cost of the China expedition.

By this treaty England secured the right of sending an ambassador to reside at Peking, and the reiteration of her right to communicate freely with high Chinese officials. The British ambassador was henceforth to be admitted to audience with the Emperor of China, without being required to perform the kowtow or any other degrading ceremony. Christianity was recognised by Article 8, in these words: "The Christian religion, as professed by Protestants and Roman Catholics, inculcates the practice of virtue, and teaches man to do as he would be done by. Persons teaching it or professing it, therefore, shall alike be entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities; nor shall any such, peaceably pursuing their calling, and not offending against the laws, be persecuted or interfered with."

The Yang-tsze River was thrown open to foreign trade, as were the ports of New-Chwang, Tang-Chow, Tai-Wau (Formosa), Chau-Chow (Swatow), and Kiung-Chow (Hainan). Finally, by Article 56, it was agreed that ratifications should be exchanged at Peking within one year from the signing of the treaty, June 26, 1858.

The French and Russian treaties also provided for ratification at Peking within a year.

Subsequent events showed that, in signing the treaties of 1858, China had been moved only by a desire to get rid of the barbarians, whatever the cost might be — in promises. No sooner had the ministers retired from Tientsin, taking with them the allied army and navy, than the Chinese began to fortify the mouth of the Peiho against the time when the babarians should return to ratify their treaties at Peking.

Lord Elgin returned to England early in 1859; and Mr. (afterwards Sir Frederick) Bruce was appointed Envoy Extraordinary to China, charged with the task of carrying to Peking the ratified copy of the treaty of Tientsin and of receiving a copy ratified by the Emperor in return.

From the moment he arrived in China, Mr. Bruce perceived that the Imperial authorities had no intention of permitting him to go to Peking. After a great deal of discussion, he went, accompanied by M. Bourdolon (the French envoy, on a similar mission), to the mouth of the Peiho. Here, as soon as he attempted to pass up to Peking, the Chinese forts opened fire on his vessel, and, despite the utmost efforts of the British sailors, compelled him to retire from the entrance of the river. It was on this occasion that the United States Commodore Tatnall justified his friendly assistance in towing boat-loads of British marines into action by the famous expression, "Blood is thicker than water."

The affair at the Taku forts in 1859 has a certain peculiar interest at the present time from the

fact that the troops at the forts were ordered to represent themselves, in the event of defeat by the English, as merely local militia acting without authority from Peking. Thus, if the Chinese were defeated, the Imperial authorities would have been able to disclaim responsibility. The analogy between this instance and that of the "Boxer" troops in Peking is instructive.

In view of the repulse at Taku the work of Lord Elgin's mission had to be done all over again. Accordingly, Lord Elgin was again appointed Ambassador Extraordinary in behalf of England, and Baron Gros received a similar reappointment from the French government.¹

Lord Elgin and his suite arrived at Hongkong on June 21, 1860. Here he learned that Mr. Bruce had delivered an ultimatum to the Chinese authorities, in compliance with instructions from Lord John Russell,² and had intimated that an early reply would be looked for at Shanghai. The terms of the ultimatum were an apology for the act of the troops which fired on the ships of the British embassy at Taku, the ratification without delay at Peking of the treaty of 1858, and the payment of four million taels, as stipulated in that treaty, for losses incurred by British subjects in Canton.³

¹ For an account of Lord Elgin's second mission, see *Personal Narrative of Occurrences during Lord Elgin's Second Embassy to China*, 1860, by Henry Brougham Loch, Private Secretary to the Earl of Elgin. London, 1870.

² *Sessional Papers*, 1861, vol. 66, No. 2754, pp. 1 and 2.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 33, and 34.

This ultimatum was met by a flat refusal on all points.¹

Affairs were thus at a deadlock when Lord Elgin and Baron Gros arrived a second time in China. Without delay, therefore, the Ambassadors went north to the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, accompanied by the allied forces, naval and military. The British contingent, about thirteen thousand strong, was under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant and Vice-Admiral Hope; and the French contingent, numbering less than nine thousand, was commanded by General De Montauban and Vice-Admiral Charner.

Anchored once more near the mouth of the Peiho, the embassies were compelled to undergo an irritating correspondence with the Chinese authorities. Hang, Governor-General of the Province of Chih-li, whose only desire was to obtain favor at Court by preventing the ambassadors from proceeding up to Tientsin, wrote to Lord Elgin, informing him that he, the Governor-General, was empowered by the Emperor to discuss matters and arrange for the ratification of the treaties. It was soon discovered, however, that Hang had no proper credentials. Foiled in this attempt, Hang wrote that if Lord Elgin would wait at Peh-tang (a few miles from the mouth of the Peiho) the Imperial Commissioners, Wan-tsiun and Hang-ti, would shortly arrive to conduct the embassy to Peking.

In the mean time the allied forces assaulted and

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1861, vol. 66, No. 2754, pp. 42, 43.

captured the Taku forts. Under the influence of this defeat the governor-general of Chih-li asked Lord Elgin to proceed up the river to Tientsin, there to await the arrival of the Imperial Commissioners. The Peking authorities appear to have been much alarmed by the approach of Lord Elgin; and they appointed Kweiliang as an additional commissioner, instructing him to proceed at once to Tientsin.

Kweiliang, who, it will be remembered, was one of the Imperial Commissioners who signed the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858, wrote to Lord Elgin informing him of his appointment, and stating that he was equipped with full powers to discuss and to dispose of all matters of controversy. In a later despatch Kweiliang wrote Lord Elgin that he was authorised to agree to all the points raised in the British ultimatum, and that under these circumstances the military operations of the allies should be suspended.

Lord Elgin replied that he would at once cause a cessation of hostilities if the Imperial Commissioners would sign a Convention in accordance with the promises contained in their note. But, when it came to the point, the Commissioners admitted that they had no power to do so. The whole affair was simply a ruse to gain time.

It would be wearisome to describe in detail the events which followed. As soon as the imperial authorities found that Kweiliang and his colleagues were not able to induce Lord Elgin to stay his

progress, they appointed two new commissioners, Tsai, Prince of I, and Muh-yin, President of the Board of War. The new Commissioners promised everything, and failed in performance as the others had done. At last matters were brought to a head by the seizure of Messrs. Parkes and Loch, with their escort, when they went by arrangement into the Chinese camp to discuss affairs with the Commissioners. The whole party was captured, and were brutally ill-treated on the way to Peking. Of the twenty-six persons who were thus seized, in violation of a flag of truce, thirteen were either murdered outright or died from the effects of the tortures which they suffered at the hands of the Chinese.¹

When Lord Elgin realised what had befallen his messengers, he determined to push on at once to Peking. When he reached Pa-li-chiau, he received a communication from Prince Kung, brother of the

¹ See *Personal Narrative of Occurrences during Lord Elgin's Second Embassy to China*, by Henry Brougham Loch, pp. 127-238.

Sessional Papers, 1861, vol. 66, No 2754, pp. 190-195, 226-244.

"After we had all been tied, they put water on our bonds to tighten them. They then lifted us up, and took us into a court-yard, where we remained in the open for three days, exposed to the sun and cold. We had nothing to eat all that time. If we spoke a word or asked for water, we were beaten and stamped upon. They kicked us about the head with their boots. If we asked for something to eat, they crammed dirt down our mouths." (Evidence of Mahomed Khan, 4th Troop, Fane's Horse.)

"Lieutenant Anderson became delirious, and remained so, with a few lucid intervals, until his death, which occurred on the ninth day of his imprisonment. Two days before his death his nails and fingers burst from the tightness of the cords. Whilst he was alive, worms were generated in his wounds, and eat into and crawled over his body." (Evidence of Jowalla Sing, Duffadar, 1st Troop, Fane's Horse.)

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Emperor, to the effect that Tsai and Muh-yin having failed to conduct negotiations satisfactorily, the Emperor had appointed him Imperial Commissioner in place of the former Commissioners.

A brief extract from a letter addressed by Lord Elgin to Prince Kung will give the reader some idea of the condition of affairs at Peking immediately prior to the final surrender on Oct. 19, 1860:

"The Undersigned has further to inform his Serene Highness that the letter of the Commander-in-chief, stating the terms on which the city of Peking would be spared, was written before he knew the treatment to which the British and French subjects, seized, in violation of a flag of truce, on the 18th ultimo, had been subjected, and when all the evidence which he possessed on this point was contained in the despatch of the Prince to the Undersigned, in which despatch the Prince repeatedly averred that the prisoners in question had suffered no mortal injury, were comfortably lodged, and treated with all proper attention.¹

"Information since received establishes the fact that at the time these words were written several subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, not taken in fight, but seized and bound while relying on the security that should have been afforded them by a flag of truce, and offering no resistance, had already died from the effects of the barbarous cruelty to which they and their companions had

¹ Compare with the information sent out in regard to the besieged legations in July and August, 1899.

been subjected as prisoners. This flagrant misrepresentation of the facts of the case, for which the Prince is himself responsible, would fully justify the Commander-in-chief in setting at nought the conditions under which the gate of the city was surrendered into his hands; but he is still desirous to spare, if possible, the lives of the common people.

“The Undersigned begs to remind His Serene Highness that, in the first communication which he had the honour to address to him, he informed him that suspension of hostilities and negotiation of peace would be impossible until the officers and subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, still missing, had returned. To that declaration he has constantly adhered.

“How has this condition, which the Undersigned has throughout declared to be indispensable to the resumption of negotiations for the establishment of peace, been fulfilled by Prince Kung and the government which he represents?

“Of the total number of twenty-six British subjects, seized in defiance of honour and of the laws of nations, thirteen only have been restored alive, all of whom carry on their persons evidence, more or less distinctly marked, of the indignities and ill-treatment from which they have suffered, and thirteen have been barbarously murdered, under circumstances on which the Undersigned will not dwell, lest his indignation should find vent in words which are not suitable to a communication of this nature.

"Until this foul deed shall have been expiated, peace between Great Britain and the existing Dynasty of China is impossible.

"The following, therefore, are the conditions the immediate acceptance of which will alone avert from it the doom impending on it: —

"What remains of the Palace of Yuen-ming-yuen,¹ which appears to be the place at which several of the British captives were subjected to the grossest indignities, will be immediately levelled with the ground. This condition requires no assent on the part of His Highness, because it will be at once carried into effect by the Commander-in-chief.

"A sum of 300,000 taels must be paid down at once to the officers appointed by the Undersigned to receive it, which sum will be appropriated at the discretion of Her Majesty's government to those who have suffered, and to the families of the murdered men.

"The immediate signature of the Convention² drawn up at Tientsin. . . .

"ELGIN AND KINCARDINE."³

In face of the determined attitude of the British and French envoys, Prince Kung finally yielded on all points.

On Oct. 24, 1860, in the Hall of Ceremonies at Peking, a Convention between Her Majesty and

¹ The palace had already been partially destroyed by the allied forces.

² *Sessional Papers*, 1861, vol. 66, No. 2754, pp. 153, 155.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 216, 218.

the Emperor of China ' was signed ; and the ratifications of the treaty of Tientsin, 1858, were exchanged. Thus ended Lord Elgin's second embassy to China.²

From 1860 up to the end of the Chino-Japanese War, in 1895, Chinese foreign relations passed through a transitional period, marked at the beginning and at the end by an attitude of fearlessness, almost of contempt, on the part of the European Powers, but with a strong and increasing note of apprehension in the middle, which ran up in vigorous *crescendo* to its highest point at the declaration of hostilities between China and Japan, and broke off abruptly when the issue of the conflict was known.

During this period Anglo-Chinese relations, in so far as they were strictly such and not Anglo-Russo - Franco - Chinese relations, were comparatively satisfactory, the Yang Chow outrage and the murder of Mr. Augustus Margary being the

¹ *Sessional Papers*, 1861, vol. 69, No. 2755, pp. 20-22.

² For English accounts of Lord Elgin's second embassy and of the war of 1860, consult: *The Life of Sir Harry Parkes*, vol. i., by Stanley Lane-Poole, London, 1894; *Personal Narrative of Occurrences during Lord Elgin's Second Embassy to China*, 1860, by Henry Brougham Loch, London, 1870; *Narrative of the North China Campaign of 1860*, by Robert Swinhoe, London, 1861; *Narrative of the War with China in 1860*, by Lord Wolseley, London, 1862; *Personal Narrative of Service in China*, by Lieutenant Colonel Fisher, London, 1863; *Sessional Papers*, 1860, vol. 69, Nos. 2695, 2618, 2587, 2606, 2641, 2677, 2685, and 2714; *Sessional Papers*, 1861, vol. 66, Nos. 2754, 2755, 2777, 2832, and 2840; *Sessional Papers*, 1862, vol. 63, No. 2919. The French accounts of the war and of the mission of Baron Gros are referred to in the chapter on "France and China."

only occurrences worthy of note which marred the intercourse between the two countries.

The former affair, which took place in August, 1868, was merely one of the periodical attacks on missionaries; and, after a good deal of correspondence¹ compensation was secured for the loss of property and for a few slight personal injuries.

The Margary murder was of a more serious nature, and merits some notice.

Yunnan, one of the western provinces of China, has a boundary with British Burmah; and an excellent opportunity for trade thus exists in that region. In 1868 a mission under Major Sladen crossed the Burmese frontier, and reached Momien, the capital of Yunnan. The object of the mission was to examine the possibilities of opening up a trade route and, incidentally, to make a political reconnaissance. At the time, however, Yunnan was in a very disturbed condition, as a Mohammedan faction had taken up arms against the Chinese authorities, and vigorous fighting was going on. In consequence, Major Sladen could get no further than Momien.

In 1874 the revolt was terminated by the complete overthrow of the rebels, and Chinese authority was more firmly established than ever. The Indian government at once decided to send another mission, and Colonel Horace Browne was selected to undertake the journey. In order to make the work more complete, it was arranged that Mr. Augustus Raymond Margary, an attaché of the British em-

¹ *British Sessional Papers*, 1868-69, Nos. 4097-i., 4097-ix.

bassy in China, an accomplished Chinese scholar, should leave Shanghai and cross China to meet Colonel Browne's party at Bhamo, on the Irrawaddy, the whole mission then to return to Shanghai along the route traversed by Margary on his outward journey.

Margary left Shanghai on Aug. 23, 1874, and reached Bhamo on January 17 of the following year. Colonel Browne had already arrived there; and, after a short rest, the whole party, being provided with proper passports from the Chinese government, started out to cross China. On reaching the Burmese frontier at Nampoung, news was received that the Kakhyen tribe intended to dispute the passage of the mission. Margary offered to go on in front and investigate; and this he did on Feb. 19, 1875. He was attended only by a Chinese secretary and by his body servants. Two days later he was murdered, together with his attendants, by a body of Chinese under command of one Shouk-goon, nephew of a high official named Li-hsieh-t'ai.

Colonel Browne and his party were also attacked, but they succeeded in fighting their way back into Burmah.

This outrage became the subject of a prolonged discussion between the British minister and the Tsungli Yamen, which was terminated only after Sir Thomas Wade had quitted Peking and the British fleet had entered the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, by the Convention of Chifu, signed by Sir Thomas Wade and by Li Hung Chang, on Sept. 13, 1876, securing

an indemnity of 200,000 taels to England and an apology in the form of an Imperial letter.¹

From 1876 up to the present time it is more convenient to discuss Anglo-Chinese relations as part of the general Chinese question; and this is done in the final chapter on "The Conflicting Interests and Ambitions of the Great Powers in China."

Before passing to a consideration of Russo-Chinese relations, a few words may be said about the Chinese in the British colonies.

According to circumstances, the Chinaman has been viewed as a curse or as a blessing in the British colonies. In British Guiana, in the Straits Settlements, and in other tropical colonies where the Chinaman has penetrated as a labourer, he has been welcomed as, on the whole, a desirable addition to the population. In these countries his industry and thrift have made him conspicuous in a population generally idle and untrustworthy.

But in the British non-tropical colonies the Chinaman has met with a reception similar to that accorded him in the United States. The same arguments for his exclusion have been applied in Australia and in Canada as were applied in California,² and the results have been the same.

¹ For the Margary case see:—

A Narrative of the Two Expeditions to Western China in 1868 and 1875. London, 1876. By John Anderson, M.D.

The Journey of Augustus Raymond Margary from Shanghai to Bhamo, and back to Manwyne. London, 1876.

British Sessional Papers, 1876, vol. 82, Nos. C. 1422 and C. 1605; 1877, vol. 88, No. C. 1832.

² See *supra*, p. 58.

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In Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, laws have been passed from time to time, restricting the immigration of Chinese. In Australia the anti-Chinese feeling was quite as violent as in California.

In 1887 a Chinese commission visited the Australian colonies, to inquire into the condition of Chinese subjects residing there. The Chinese Minister at St. James's subsequently called the attention of Lord Salisbury to the fact that his countrymen in Australia were the subjects of discriminating legislation, and were forced to pay a poll tax of £10, from which the subjects of other Powers were exempt. This he pronounced to be "incompatible with Her Majesty's international engagements." The Imperial government, however, found that anti-Chinese feeling ran too high in Australia to brook any interference. Lord Carrington, then governor of New South Wales, wrote to the Foreign Office that, "if we have no voice in making treaties, it seems only just that our interests should be considered and protected by those who exercise that power." The language of Sir Harry Parkes, Premier of New South Wales, was more directly to the point. On the occasion of a subsequent protest from the Chinese minister in London, the great Australian statesman declared, "neither for Her Majesty's ships of war, nor for Her Majesty's representative on the spot, nor for her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, do we intend to turn aside from our purpose."

In the British colonies, as elsewhere, the force of public opinion has been sufficient to compel anti-Chinese legislation.¹

¹ For a discussion of the Chinese question in the British colonies, consult:—

Problems of Greater Britain, by Sir Charles Dilke.

"The Chinese in the Straits of Malacca," by W. A. Pickering, *Fraser's Magazine*, October, 1876.

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Chapter V.

RUSSIA AND CHINA.

The story of Russian intercourse with China is of much greater interest than the Anglo-Chinese narrative, and is more easily told. In dealing with England, we found little that could chain the attention. Although the wars of 1840, 1857, and 1859 represented material capable of effective treatment as wars, they afforded little scope either in regard to their origin or their results, when viewed from the standpoint of international policy.

As far as the European Powers were concerned, these three wars were in no sense part of a definite policy.

The "Opium" War, the "Arrow" War, and the "Ratification" War were merely isolated appeals to force, as a solution of specific problems, and, as such, give us no indication of any Chinese policy, real or conjectural, on the part of the British government.

It is this absence of definite, or at least of ulterior aim which distinguishes the Chinese policy of England from that of Russia; for in regard to Russia we have a clear and declared Asiatic policy, which, during nearly three centuries, has remained fixed and constant, despite many temporary checks in the direct line and some absorbing diversions in the lesser field of Russia's European ambitions.

The immediate ambitions of Russia in regard to China will be discussed in a later chapter. My

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present purpose is merely to give a brief outline of Russo-Chinese intercourse up to within recent years. This subject cannot be efficiently presented without some reference to the general course of Russian expansion in Asia.

As far as the general foreign intercourse of Russia is concerned, the main factor has always been her lack of good sea-ports. Around this single circumstance have centred the most notable events of her modern history. The whole course of European affairs has been moulded by the fact that Riga and Archangel are ice-bound for several months each year; and the similar condition of Vladivostok is one of the controlling factors in Asiatic politics.

Russo-Turkish relations represent the outcome of Russia's desire to have a satisfactory port in Europe. Russo-Chinese relations reflect Russia's mind in the matter of an ice-free port in the Pacific.

The first trans-Ural venture of Russia was undertaken in 1579, when Gregory Strogonof and Yermak Timofevitch, under the authority of Ivan the Terrible, penetrated into the country watered by the Tobol and the Irtish, and defeated Kutchum Khan, the most important nomad chief in that district.

In a very few years the Russians succeeded in flinging a line of military posts right across country to the Pacific. Tobolsk was founded in 1587, Tomsk in 1604, Yakutsk in 1637, and Okhotsk, on

the Pacific, in 1638. It was but a few years after the founding of Okhotsk that the Russian encroachments on China began. Peter Petrovitch, the first governor of Yakutsk, having heard rumours of the excellent lands along the banks of the Amur, sent an expedition in 1643, under command of one Poyarkoff, to explore the river. After three years' absence, Poyarkoff returned to Yakutsk, having succeeded in tracing the Amur to its mouth.

The next expedition into the Amur districts was undertaken in 1649 by a young Russian officer of means, named Khabaroff. While going down the river in barges Khabaroff's party encountered a body of Manchu cavalry occupied in collecting the annual tribute for transmission to Peking. This occurred in 1650, and was the first direct contact of Russian and Chinese forces.

Khabaroff's party soon ran short of provisions; and it became necessary to construct a fort, and then despatch a strong foraging party down the river. This was done; but the natives took advantage of the situation, and, with the assistance of the Tartar general, Izinei, attacked the fort, and succeeded in driving Khabaroff up stream again.

By this time news had reached Russia of the doings in Eastern Siberia, and Tsar Alexis decided to occupy the Amur territory. Accordingly, he appointed Prince Ivan Rostovski to the command of an expedition, the advance-guard of which, under Dimitri Simoviof, reached the Amur in 1653. Khabaroff was found at the mouth of the Dzeya;

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and he, together with Simoviof, started at once for Moscow, in order to report to the Tsar, the command of the small Russian force devolving on Onufrei Stepanof.

By the time Khabaroff and his companion arrived in Moscow, the Tsar's plans had changed, and the Rostovski expedition was given up. Stepanof, left to himself, proceeded to annex all the territory he could reach, and whilst thus engaged was killed, with most of his men, in 1658.

For eleven years the Amur territory was free from Russian intrusion. In 1669, however, one Tchernigovsky, a Siberian convict, collected a small band of his fellow-prisoners and made a successful dash for liberty. The little party, much reduced by disease, famine, and conflict, finally reached the Amur, and founded the town of Albazin.

Tchernigovsky was a shrewd fellow, and realised that in the promotion of Russian interests on the Amur lay his best hope of pardon for past offences. Accordingly, he set about collecting tribute from the natives around Albazin, and forwarded the revenue periodically to Nerchinsk. The results justified his hopes, for the governor of Nerchinsk formally recognised the settlement of Albazin in 1671; and the Tsar Alexis, on learning the facts, sent a pardon to Tchernigovsky, together with a present of 2,000 roubles.

As time passed, the affairs of Eastern Siberia gradually came to fill a very important place in the minds of Russian expansionists; and in 1675

Nikolas Spafarik was sent from Moscow to Peking in order to learn the views of the Chinese authorities in regard to frontier affairs. He received the next best thing to positively favourable assurances; that is, positively unfavourable assurances. The Amur districts were to be considered Chinese, and all rights of navigation of the Amur and of the other great rivers in that region were to be reserved to Chinese subjects.

During the fourteen years which elapsed between Spafarik's mission and the signing of the treaty of Nerchinsk, a good deal of fighting occurred on the Amur. In 1685 an army of 18,000 Chinese attacked Albazin, and compelled the Russians to retire on Nerchinsk. The town was recaptured by the Russian general, Tolbusin, in the following year, and a few months later was on the point of being again taken by the Chinese, when news reached the district that the Russian and Chinese governments were negotiating the whole question of the boundary, whereupon hostilities ceased.

In 1685 the Tsar Alexis despatched two envoys, Nikifor Venukof and Ivan Fafarof, to Peking to announce the approaching departure from Moscow of an envoy extraordinary, charged with the task of concluding a treaty with China in regard to the Siberian frontier.

This envoy extraordinary was Prince Fedor Alexievitch Golovin, a man of indifferent abilities, and totally unfitted for his task. He left Moscow in January, 1686, and, after disregarding his instruc-

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tions in several particulars and wasting a great deal of time on the way,¹ arrived at Nerchinsk in August, 1689.

Here he found himself in the presence of an overpowering army of Chinese, nominally the escort of the Chinese commissioners, Sofanlanya and Kiw Kijew, but in reality an army prepared to carry out the instructions issued by the Emperor Kanghi, to the effect that the commissioners were "... in case of necessity, to corroborate their demands with arms."

It is curious to note that the negotiations preceding the treaty of Nerchinsk were conducted in Latin, the Chinese commissioners availing themselves of the services of two Jesuit priests, Gerbillon and Pereira, who had been long resident in Peking.

The conditions under which the treaty of Nerchinsk was signed precluded the possibility of Russia securing any favourable consideration of her claims in the Amur district; and Golovin had to put up with the best terms he could get, for in the presence of a formidable Chinese army a resort to force was impossible.

The treaty of Nerchinsk, the first treaty between China and a Western power, was signed on Aug. 27, 1689. By its terms the boundaries between Siberia and the Chinese Empire were fixed, Russia agreed that the fort at Albazin should be demolished, and that all Russians living in the village should withdraw to Russian territory, and "every-

¹ Vladimir, *Russia on the Pacific*, pp. 160-165.

thing which has occurred hitherto is to be buried in eternal oblivion.”¹

From 1689 to 1847, the year in which Count Nikolas Muravieff was appointed governor-general of Eastern Siberia, Russia abstained from aggressive action on the Amur. Her policy of Eastward expansion was by no means checked, but found its sphere of activity in Central Asia, where the subjugation of the Khanates and of Turkomania, and the wars with Persia, occupied the attention of Russian statesmen until the Tsar Nikolas made the Muravieff appointment.

For five years Muravieff was handicapped by the hostility of Count Nesselrode, the Russian foreign minister, who was opposed to any expansion in the Far East. But in 1851 the Tsar interposed his authority, and gave his full support to the young governor-general. With Nesselrode out of the way, Muravieff proceeded to carry out his carefully laid plans; and, by working in concert with Captain Nevelskoy, who was in command of a small Russian naval force in the Sea of Okhotsk, much progress was made. Nevelskoy founded the town of Nikolaiefsk on the Amur in 1850, and the next few years witnessed the establishment of Russian posts at De Castries Bay, on Lake Kizi, at Alexandrofsk, and at Mariinsk,—all places situated in territory acknowledging the authority of the Emperor of China.

From the day of his appointment Muravieff had

¹ An English version of the treaty is to be found on pp. 330, 331, of Alexis Krausse's *Russia in Asia*. The Latin version is to be found on pp. 343, 344, 345, of Vladimir's *Russia on the Pacific*.

no doubt kept the ultimate absorption of the Amur districts clearly in view; but a suitable opportunity of final action had not followed any of the tentative measures adopted by him. It may therefore be presumed that, when the outbreak of the Crimean War prevented the departure from the Black Sea of the victualling fleet for Kamchatka, it was with feelings of satisfaction that Muravieff found himself compelled to despatch supplies down the Amur. The supply train was a sufficient excuse for an armed escort, and the affair really took on the aspect of a reconnaissance in force.

The expedition started from Shilinsk on May 14, 1854, with Muravieff himself in command. The escort consisted of a line battalion about 800 strong, a sotnia of Cossacks, and some mountain artillery. The baggage and stores were carried in seventy-five barges; and the steamer *Argun*, which Muravieff had had built for the expedition, completed the flotilla.

After a week's journey the party reached the point where the old fortress of Albazin had stood. The occasion was a solemn one; and Muravieff with his officers landed and knelt in prayer on the spot where the Russian pioneers had lived two centuries before, while the band played hymns and the soldiers stood by with uncovered heads.

We are, as a rule, very intolerant of the patriotism or national spirit of other nations, and thus we can easily misapprehend and underestimate the importance of Muravieff's dramatic appeal at Albazin; but

it was in fact the psychological moment which marked the beginning of a new crusade.

From this point on fortune favoured Muravieff. The hostilities incident to the Crimean War spread to the Pacific, and the allied squadron of France and England attacked the Russian forts at Petropavlofsk. Had it not been for the re-enforcements which had been despatched from Eastern Siberia by way of the Amur, Petropavlofsk would probably have fallen. As it was, the allies were repulsed with heavy loss; and the Russian people turned impatiently from the disasters of the Black Sea to the triumphs on the Pacific.

Muravieff's Amur plans had been considered visionary even by his own friends in St. Petersburg; but the news of the defence of Petropavlofsk soon convinced every one that the control of the Amur was an essential feature of Russia's foreign policy.

Events now moved swiftly. The Russian government, informed of the preparations which were going on in England and France for a Chinese expedition,¹ sent out Admiral Count Putiatin as minister to Peking late in 1856. Count Putiatin made the journey overland, and at Irkutsk met Muravieff, with whom he had a prolonged interview in which the question of Russian policy in the Far East was exhaustively discussed. The two men found that they understood one another very well, and each went about his own branch of the work in hand.

¹ The preparations incident to the "Arrow" War of 1856, in which the French and English fought as allies against China.

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The fruits of their efforts are represented by the Convention of Aigun, signed on May 16, 1858, by Muravieff, and by the treaty of Tientsin, signed on June 1, 1858, by Putiatin. By the former Russia secured the recognition by China of the Russian ownership of the whole of the left bank of the Amur, from its source to the Usuri, and of both banks from the Usuri to the sea. A few days after the signing of the Convention a solemn service was held, and the troops were paraded. On this occasion Muravieff said: "Comrades, I congratulate you! We have not laboured in vain: the Amur now belongs to Russia! The prayers of the Holy Orthodox Church and the thanks of Russia are for you! Long life to Emperor Alexander II., and may the newly acquired country flourish under his protection! Hurrah!"¹ For his services on the Amur, Muravieff received the title Count Amurski.

Count Putiatin, on his part, succeeded in negotiating a treaty of commerce at Tientsin on June 13, 1858;² but both these diplomatic feats were eclipsed by General Ignatieff, who extracted from China the Treaty of Peking, signed on July 20, 1860.

As this treaty is the very foundation-stone of Russia's position in regard to China, a few words may be said of the manner in which it was concluded.

At the time when the treaty of Aigun was signed

¹ The Convention of Aigun is to be found on pp. 346, 347, of Vladimir's *Russia on the Pacific*.

² The Russian treaty of Tientsin is to be found on pp. 387-391, vol. 10, of *U.S. Senate Exec. Docs.*, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. (1859-1860).

(1858) China was engaged in hostilities with England and France, and was thus in no position to thwart the Russian plans. In 1859, however, as we have already seen,¹ the Chinese had succeeded in driving the Ambassadors of England and France from the mouth of the Peiho, whither they had repaired in the expectation of securing the ratification of the treaties of 1858. Under the influence of this momentary triumph the Chinese authorities began to repent of their concessions to Russia, and everything possible was done to make things disagreeable for the Russian colonists on the Amur.

This conduct on the part of the frontier mandarin soon set in motion an avalanche of protests to the Russian government from Russian subjects on the Amur; and, as the time seemed propitious, General Ignatieff was despatched as special Envoy to Peking, charged with the task of securing a full recognition of Russian claims on the Amur.

The time and the man were well chosen; and the Russian treaty of Peking will always remain a monument to the success of continuity of policy, backed by discreet patience and adequate force.

The Russian treaty of Peking² marks the end of the first stage of Russian encroachments on China. By the first article, Russia secured the cession of the whole of the left bank of the Amur and all the country to the east of the river Usuri, a tributary

¹ See pp. 95, 96.

² The Russian treaty of Peking is to be found on pp. 348-359 of Vladimir's *Russia on the Pacific*.

of the Amur, thus entirely shutting off Manchuria on the north and east. By the second article Russia established her foothold in the Far West of the Chinese Empire by securing recognition of her territorial acquisitions in the region of lakes Balkash and Issik Kul.

With the long-sought Amur territories incorporated finally in the Russian Empire under the name of the Amur Province, and with the trans-Usuri district re-christened the Primorskaya, Russian statesmen were free to turn their attention to pushing the interests of their country on the western boundary of China, leaving to Muravieff and his lieutenants the task of founding Russian settlements and building Russian forts in the territory secured on the eastern border.

The Russian advance in Chinese Turkestan belongs to an entirely different phase of Russian foreign policy from the advance in the Amur districts. In the latter we see the desire for a good port on the Pacific as the underlying motive. The former represents merely a small and not entirely successful unit in the great scheme of Russian control of Central Asia, with the corollary of a port on the Persian Gulf. The former ambition has been partially realised by the founding of Vladivostok, which is free of ice for ten months in the year. The larger plan is still in process of achievement. Some idea of the steady aim and unswerving purpose of Russia in her Central Asian policy may be gathered from a consideration of the following facts. In 1703

the Khan of Khiva, acting under the fear of reprisals for attacks on the Ural Cossacks, declared himself a Russian subject. In 1717 Prince Bekovitch-Tcherkaski, of the Imperial Russian body-guard, was sent by Tsar Peter the Great to make a reconnaissance of the country. On Jan. 8, 1873, Count Schouvaloff, special Envoy of Russia, informed Earl Granville, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the object of the Khivan expedition, about to be sent at that time from Russia, "was to punish acts of brigandage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, and to teach the Khan that such conduct on his part could not be continued with the impunity in which the moderation of Russia had led him to believe. Not only was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed should be such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva."¹

On Aug. 24, 1873, the very year of the above assurances, after successful military operations, the Russian General, Kaufmann, concluded the treaty of Khiva, the third article of which runs:—

"The whole of the right bank of the Amu Daria, and the lands adjoining thereunto, which have hitherto been considered as belonging to Khiva, shall pass over from the Khan into the possession

¹ *British Sessional Papers*, 1873, vol. 75, C. 699. "Correspondence with Russia respecting Central Asia," pp. 12, 13.

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of Russia, together with the people dwelling and camping thereon. Those parcels of land which are at present the property of the Khan, and of which the usufruct has been given by him to Khivan Officers of State, become likewise the property of the Russian government, free of all claims on the part of the previous owners.”¹

In addition to this the Khivans were called on to pay a war indemnity of 2,200,000 roubles. So much for Khiva.

A very similar story might be told of the Khanate of Khokand, which was declared part of the Russian Empire on March 2, 1876, of Turkestan, of the Kirghiz Steppe, and of the Khanate of Bokhara, which, though nominally independent, are, in fact, governed from St. Petersburg.

These acquisitions, together with the absorption, by conquest or treaty, of Georgia (1801), Mingrelia (1803), Imeretia (1804), Baku and Shrivani (1813), Erivan (1828), Samarkand (1868), Geok Tepe (1881), the Tejend Oasis (1883), and the Merv Oasis (1884), represent the physical expansion of Russia in near Asia.

The net result is that Russia has acquired as the reward of her steady policy of absorption in near Asia:—

	<i>Area.</i>	<i>Population.</i>
Caucasus Territory	180,843	8,350,000
Kirghiz Steppe Territory	755,793	2,000,000
Turkestan	409,414	3,341,000
Transcaspia	383,618	352,000
	<hr/> 1,729,668	<hr/> 14,043,000 ²

¹ Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 347.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

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The above brief outline of Russian expansion in Central Asia was intended merely to make more intelligible the action of Russia in regard to the Valley of the Ili by showing that there had been a general Russian policy of eastward expansion from early times, and that the Ili frontier affair would thus fit in with this general policy.

The facts in relation to the Ili frontier are these :—

Having secured recognition of her sovereignty over the Balkash and Issik Kul districts in the extreme west of China by the Treaty of Peking, Russia was placed in an excellent position to push her advance still further, if a suitable occasion should present itself. Such an occasion was not long delayed. In 1863 the Mohammedan population of Jungaria, the Chinese province having a frontier, with the Government of Semirechensk, as the Balkash and Issik Kul districts were called, rose against their Chinese masters, and, having defeated the imperial troops, massacred all the Chinese in the country. Having achieved this, the rebels began to quarrel amongst themselves; and, finally, a condition of affairs arose which was intolerable to their Russian neighbours. Accordingly, an army was sent across the frontier into Jungaria for the purpose of restoring order; and the rebels at once laid down their arms.

At this stage Russia informed China of what had occurred, and added that, as soon as China was ready to take effective control of the district, it

would be handed over again, as the Russians were there merely in the general interests of good order.

When the time came for the Russians to retire to Semirechensk the officers commanding the Russian troops found a number of good reasons why the evacuation could not be carried out; and the matter was referred to Peking. Here, also, difficulties arose; and, finally, in 1879 the Chinese government despatched a mandarin, Chunghow by name, to St. Petersburg to arrange the details of the promised evacuation.

The utmost that Chunghow was able to effect, after wasting a good deal of time in argument, was an agreement under which Russia was to restore part of Jungaria to China, was to retain part, and was further to receive 5,000,000 roubles to cover the expenses of her occupation of the territory.

These terms were, however, rejected by China; and the Marquis Tseng, Chinese Minister in London, was ordered to St. Petersburg to reopen negotiations. On this occasion Russia yielded on the main point, and restored the greater part of the Ili Valley to China. But the treaty of Ili, Feb. 12, 1881, which settled the dispute, shows that, on the whole, Russia secured better terms than under the Chunghow arrangement.¹

By article I. Russia restored the country of Ili to the Chinese government; but "Russia remains

¹ For the treaty of Ili, see *British Sessional Papers*, 1882, vol. 80, C. 3134. "Despatch from Mr. Wyndham, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg, enclosing copy of a Treaty between Russia and China, etc."

in possession of the western portion of that country." By article IV. Russians who had acquired land in Ili during the Russian occupation were confirmed in their possession. By article VI. Russia received from China 9,000,000 roubles (metallic) to meet the expenses of the occupation. By other articles, Russia acquired the right to establish several consulates in Western China, a number of privileges for Russian traders, and the specific assertion of the right of Russians to navigate the Manchurian rivers, and to trade freely in that province.

We must now turn to yet another phase of Russo-Chinese relations,—the Siberian Railway; and, as in our previous inquiries, it is necessary to go back a number of years, because the actual part played to-day by China in regard to this great Russian scheme represents merely the latest result of a series of events in which the immediate interest of China is of recent origin.

As soon as Russia had founded Okhotsk, in 1638, and had thus extended the chain of her authority from the Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, it became evident that, if the vast territory known as Siberia was to serve any useful purpose, the first requisite was good means of communication. This requirement appeared of the utmost importance, whether viewed from the standpoint of the agricultural and mineral development of the country or from the more remote ground of Russia's political ambitions in the Far East; and the great Muravieff distinguished himself in nothing more than in his

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unceasing efforts to lessen the time occupied in going from the Amur to St. Petersburg.

Up to 1843 the post-road was the only means of travel in Siberia. In that year a steamer was run on the Ob; three years later the *Constantin* entered the Amur; and in 1863 steamers plied on the Yenisei.

It was not, however, until 1857 that the first definite suggestion of a trans-Siberian railroad was made, the idea originating with an Englishman, named Dull, who offered to construct a horse-car line from Nijni-Novgorod through Kasan and Perm to one of the Pacific ports of Siberia. As Dull failed to give any idea of the cost of his proposed undertaking, nothing was done in the matter. The next suggestion came from an American, named Collins, whose plan, if more modest than Dull's, was more practical. He proposed to construct a short line of railway from Irkutsk, the capital of Eastern Siberia, to Chita, a town on the upper Amur. Collins's plan was rejected on two grounds, although it had the support of Muravieff. It was considered that the route of the proposed railroad was not sufficiently known to permit of even an approximate estimate of the cost of the line; and, further, Collins demanded certain commercial privileges which the government was not prepared to grant.

The year 1858 produced two new projects. The first came from three Englishmen,—Morrison, Horn, and Sleight,—who offered, in exchange for

a virtual trade monopoly along the line, to connect Moscow with the Pacific without any financial assistance from the Russian government. The second offer was presented by a Russian, named Sophronoff, who wished to construct a line from Saratof, on the Volga, to Peking. Both these plans were rejected.

The three projects which followed between 1862 and 1869 were based on the assumption that it was better to get something done near home than to argue indefinitely about the gigantic trans-Siberian scheme. Accordingly, attention was turned to the possibility of developing the trans-Ural mining districts by a railway joining the Volga, in Russia, with the Ob, in Siberia,—a road which would pass through the heart of the mining country.

The three plans—that of Kokoreff & Co. in 1862, that of Colonel Bogdanovitch in 1866, and that of Linbimoff in 1869—were similar in that they all started from Perm, a town on the Kama, one of the tributaries of the Volga. The one finally selected was that of Colonel Bogdanovitch, which had its Siberian terminus at Tiumen on the Tura, a tributary of the Ob. This line was commenced in 1875, was completed as far as Ekaterinburg in 1878, and was open to Tiumen in 1884.

Following the construction of the Perm-Tiumen line came two short lines, one joining Samara, on the Volga, with Miass, a small town on the eastern slope of the Urals, the other connecting Samara with Orenburg, on the Ural River. The question

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then resolved itself into this: If Vladivostok was to be connected by rail with the general Russian system, which of the three railroads already stretching to the east should be prolonged across the Asiatic continent?

The Perm-Tiumen line was easily set aside; for, as it was not connected with the general railroad system of Russia, there would be the necessity of building a line from Perm to Nijni-Novgorod, a distance of about 500 miles, in order to effect this junction. The Samara-Slatoust-Miass line could be extended through Kurgan, Omsk, Kainsk, Kolywan, Mariinsk, and Krassnojarsk to Nijni-Udinsk, some 1,800 miles. The Samara-Orenburg line could be carried to the same point by way of a southerly route, passing through Orsk, Atbassar, Akmolinsk, Pavlodar, Biisk, and Minusinsk, about 2,200 miles. The latter was open to two objections,—the additional 400 miles to be covered, and the fact that between Orsk and Biisk the line would be exposed to drought in summer and blizzards in winter, while between Biisk and Nijni-Udinsk the extremely mountainous character of the country would make construction very expensive.

Accordingly, the Samara-Slatoust-Miass line was chosen.

Effect was given to this decision by an Imperial Rescript, dated March 17, 1891 (March 29, Russian style). The Rescript was addressed to the Cesarevitch (now Czar Nicholas II.), who was at that time engaged in his tour around the world. It reached

him at Vladivostok on May 12 (24), 1891. In part, it ran as follows:—

In commanding that the continuous railway right through Siberia be now begun, in order to facilitate communication, I commission you to proclaim this my will, on re-entering Russia, after having visited the foreign lands of the East. At the same time I charge you to lay the first rail in Vladivostok of the Usuri section of the Great Siberian Railway, which is now decided upon, and is to be constructed at the expense of the Imperial Exchequer and under the direct orders of government.

ALEXANDER.

In accordance with this mandate the Cesarevitch turned the first sod of the Siberian Railway at Vladivostok on May 19, 1891.

The details of construction do not concern us here. Suffice it to say that the work was divided into seven sections:—

Section 1. The Western Siberian line, from Chelabinsk to the river Ob, 880 miles.

Section 2. The Central Siberian line, from the Ob to Irkutsk, 1,162½ miles.

Section 3. The Circumbaikalian line, from Irkutsk to Mysovaya, round the southern shore of Lake Baikal, 194 miles.

Section 4. The Transbaikalian line, from Mysovaya to Strietensk, 669 miles.

Section 5. The Amur line, from Strietensk to Khabarofsk, 1,326 miles.

Section 6. North Usurian line, from Khabarofsk to Graphska, 230 miles.

Section 7. South Usurian line, from Graphska to Vladivostok, 253 miles.

Total length, 4,714½ miles.

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Owing to the fact that Russia obtained in 1896 permission to carry the Siberian Railway right through Manchuria, from Strietensk to Vladivostok, sections 5, 6, and 7, as given above, which represent a long detour along the banks of the Amur and the Usuri, need not be utilised. The history of this remarkable concession by the Chinese government is given in the chapter on "The Conflicting Interests and Ambitions of the Great Powers in China."¹

We may understand the important bearing of the Siberian Railway on the question of Russian influence on China if we consider that the distance from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok may be covered by rail, allowing an average speed of twenty-five miles an hour, in ten days, while it will require under favourable conditions thirty days to go from London to Vladivostok by water.

The last rail connecting Moscow with Strietensk was laid on Dec. 28, 1899. From that day it became possible to make a through journey by rail and steamer from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok. The journey from St. Petersburg to Listvinitchnoi, on the western shore of Lake Baikal, is made by rail. The lake is crossed by boat in summer and by rails over the ice in winter. From Myssowa (Muissov) on the eastern shore of the lake, to Strietensk the

¹ For an account of the Siberian Railway, see Vladimir's *Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway*; Krahmer's *Siberien und die grosse sibirische Eisenbahn*; and Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu's *The Awakening of the East*. For further references, see Bibliography under *Russia and China*, sub-title *Siberian Railway*.

railroad is used again; and, from Strietensk to Khabarofsk, steamers convey the passengers down the Shilka and the Amur. At Khabarofsk the railroad completes the route to Vladivostok.

A ticket from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, with first-class accommodations, including board, is \$125.

This great railway, which is to cost \$400,000,000, of which \$300,000,000 has already been expended, will enable Russia to exert an influence at Peking which will seriously menace the interests of those nations whose progress in Asia it will be the policy of Russia to check.

However we may be inclined to look with alarm and suspicion on Russia's every move in the Far East, we cannot withhold our admiration from the adroitness of her policy, the patriotism of her officers, and the magnificent audacity of her purpose, which have combined to place her in a position in regard to the Far East which, were it not for the splendid development of Japan, would be well-nigh unassailable.



COMPARATIVE TABLES

Showing an Analysis of the Trade of China
with Foreign Nations, 1880-1899, inclusive

I. VALUE OF IMPORTS INTO CHINA (in thousands of dollars).

FROM	1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889
United Kingdom	30,196	32,402	25,883	22,940	22,876	30,710	26,883	30,800	34,952	24,342
Hong Kong	41,749	42,574	40,107	39,418	41,540	45,143	42,566	69,313	80,317	72,877
India	28,574	36,068	25,204	23,243	22,058	20,071	20,718	6,644	7,022	9,093
Straits Settlements	1,191	1,552	2,160	1,938	1,985	2,208	1,508	1,669	2,347	2,155
Australasia	306	581	731	572	159	327	304	324	175	357
South Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
British America	141	307	302	226	90	65	34	113	1,319	1,088
Total British.	102,157	114,024	94,387	88,337	88,708	99,124	92,073	108,863	126,732	109,912
United States	1,663	4,505	4,322	3,669	3,264	4,243	5,660	4,078	3,618	4,377
Russia in Asia.	238	154	210	210	335	247	246	142	202	207
Russia in Europe.	—	—	12	15	14	3	1	—	336	674
Rest of Europe	3,170	3,377	3,429	3,217	2,365	3,223	3,354	3,106	3,397	2,537
Japan	4,831	5,162	6,130	5,065	4,936	6,738	6,943	6,678	6,041	7,592
Other Countries	603	928	1,024	1,049	725	863	675	2,528	4,924	4,952
Grand Total.	112,662	128,150	109,714	101,562	100,347	114,441	108,961	125,395	145,850	130,251
FROM	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
United Kingdom	31,252	35,554	30,891	27,030	23,057	27,168	36,103	29,012	24,473	29,318
Hong Kong	91,512	81,787	74,704	77,655	63,466	70,553	73,999	65,341	68,050	86,210
India	13,081	14,968	14,831	16,076	15,345	13,555	18,652	14,549	13,395	23,295
Straits Settlements	2,250	2,123	2,054	2,350	1,796	2,029	2,624	2,071	1,834	2,662
Australasia	287	132	342	104	279	327	474	59	155	199
South Africa	—	—	—	2	1	—	—	—	—	—
British America	777	1,122	744	1,259	826	1,249	1,740	4,715	1,376	883
Total British.	139,159	135,686	123,566	124,470	104,770	114,881	133,592	115,747	109,283	142,567
United States	4,669	9,278	6,486	5,226	7,133	4,074	7,663	9,019	12,014	16,271
Russia in Asia.	268	217	171	172	154	89	160	151	210	211
Russia in Europe.	872	1,061	418	676	661	1,434	1,646	2,345	1,018	2,360
Rest of Europe	3,138	5,257	5,487	5,007	4,444	7,640	7,640	6,210	6,579	7,426
Japan	9,384	6,846	7,171	7,538	7,030	13,756	14,086	16,359	19,763	26,205
Other Countries	6,031	4,868	3,742	4,105	3,356	3,682	4,628	4,040	4,855	4,803
Grand Total.	163,521	163,213	147,041	147,194	127,548	143,958	171,415	153,871	153,122	199,843

II. VALUE OF EXPORTS FROM CHINA (in thousands of dollars).

TO	1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889
United Kingdom	38,397	31,028	30,786	33,292	26,278	28,150	24,090	19,780	19,206	18,006
Hong Kong	22,920	24,107	22,732	25,544	23,274	20,314	27,515	37,672	38,585	40,465
India	1,526	674	658	753	859	754	649	958	1,193	1,254
Straits Settlements	1,346	1,604	1,419	1,263	1,154	1,279	1,147	1,604	1,555	1,480
Australasia	2,619	2,932	3,068	2,186	2,240	2,406	2,516	2,521	3,612	2,210
South Africa	81	153	153	208	198	238	71	226	309	237
British America	87	23	80	107	312	3	83	155	305	227
Total British	66,976	60,548	58,916	63,353	54,324	53,144	56,071	62,916	64,765	63,879
United States	12,568	13,953	11,620	9,962	11,178	10,621	11,817	10,609	10,307	8,147
Russia in Asia	5,927	4,809	5,320	5,489	5,720	5,000	6,793	7,604	6,217	5,129
Russia in Europe	1,461	1,406	1,395	2,378	1,689	1,212	1,794	1,577	2,216	3,253
Rest of Europe	16,368	13,385	12,078	10,593	13,395	9,349	14,552	13,854	14,887	20,164
Japan	3,040	2,409	2,438	1,912	2,425	1,908	1,491	2,536	4,096	7,439
Other Countries	1,139	1,021	1,248	1,430	1,720	1,974	1,675	3,847	3,773	3,480
Grand Total	107,479	97,531	92,925	95,117	90,651	83,208	94,193	103,033	106,261	111,491
TO	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
United Kingdom	16,631	16,526	11,209	11,201	8,855	8,457	9,138	9,385	7,501	10,192
Hong Kong	41,823	45,350	43,550	46,358	39,111	43,819	43,783	43,791	43,459	52,448
India	1,341	1,876	1,501	2,026	1,958	2,211	1,762	758	927	1,204
Straits Settlements	1,861	1,655	1,592	1,720	1,481	1,510	1,409	1,347	1,506	1,629
Australasia	1,607	1,436	1,740	1,006	722	970	557	389	640	489
South Africa	273	226	230	213	152	218	200	146	200	173
British America	616	623	170	286	118	186	346	217	258	190
Total British	64,152	67,594	59,902	63,410	52,397	57,371	57,267	56,033	54,491	66,385
United States	10,370	10,841	11,540	11,257	12,661	12,306	9,010	12,925	8,391	15,831
Russia in Asia	6,533	6,422	5,444	6,093	5,893	8,905	8,019	9,051	8,955	9,646
Russia in Europe	4,714	6,932	2,092	2,916	2,595	3,578	3,455	2,847	3,504	3,900
Rest of Europe	14,770	17,879	18,369	15,221	14,722	16,938	14,643	18,762	18,150	26,838
Japan	6,137	6,961	8,618	8,964	7,127	11,858	9,217	12,055	11,265	12,593
Other Countries	3,999	4,508	3,800	4,104	3,245	3,679	3,963	6,864	6,570	7,730
Grand Total	110,675	121,137	109,765	111,965	98,640	114,635	116,174	118,537	111,326	142,923

III. IMPORTS INTO CHINA.

PROPORTION SUPPLIED BY THE PRINCIPAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

	1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889
British Empire	90.68	88.98	86.03	86.98	88.40	86.61	84.50	86.82	86.89	84.39
United States	1.48	3.51	4.12	3.61	3.25	3.71	5.20	3.25	2.48	3.36
Russia in Asia20	.12	.19	.21	.34	.22	.23	.11	.14	.16
Russia in Europe	—	—	.01	.01	.01	—	—	—	.23	.51
Other Europe	2.81	2.64	3.13	3.17	2.36	2.82	3.08	2.48	2.33	1.95
Japan	4.29	4.03	5.59	4.99	4.92	5.89	6.37	5.32	4.55	5.83
Other Countries54	.72	.93	1.03	.72	.75	.62	2.02	3.38	3.80
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
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	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
British Empire	85.11	83.13	84.04	84.56	82.14	79.80	77.93	75.22	71.37	71.34
United States	2.86	5.69	4.41	3.55	5.59	2.83	5.64	5.86	7.85	8.14
Russia in Asia16	.13	.12	.12	.12	.06	.09	.10	.14	.11
Russia in Europe53	.65	.28	.46	.52	1.00	.96	1.52	.66	1.18
Other Europe	3.22	3.49	3.73	3.40	3.49	4.20	4.46	4.04	4.30	3.72
Japan	5.73	4.20	4.88	5.12	5.51	9.55	8.22	10.63	12.51	13.11
Other Countries	3.69	2.98	2.54	2.79	2.63	2.56	2.70	2.63	3.17	2.40
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

IV. EXPORTS FROM CHINA.

PROPORTION TAKEN BY EACH OF THE PRINCIPAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

	1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889
British Empire	62.32	62.08	63.40	66.61	59.92	63.87	59.53	61.06	60.95	57.29
United States	11.69	14.31	12.51	10.47	12.33	12.76	12.55	10.39	9.70	7.31
Russia in Asia	5.51	4.93	5.73	5.77	6.31	6.01	7.21	7.38	5.85	4.60
Russia in Europe	1.36	1.44	1.40	2.50	1.86	1.46	1.90	1.53	2.09	2.92
Other Europe	15.23	13.72	13.00	11.14	15.00	11.24	15.45	13.45	14.01	18.09
Japan	2.83	2.47	2.62	2.01	2.68	2.29	1.58	2.46	3.85	6.67
Other Countries	1.06	1.05	1.34	1.50	1.90	2.37	1.78	3.73	3.55	3.12
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
British Empire	57.96	55.80	54.57	56.63	53.12	50.05	53.94	47.27	48.95	46.45
United States	9.37	8.95	10.51	10.05	12.84	10.73	8.49	10.90	7.54	11.07
Russia in Asia	5.90	5.30	4.96	5.44	5.97	7.77	8.12	7.64	8.04	6.75
Russia in Europe	4.26	5.72	1.91	2.60	2.63	3.12	3.25	2.40	3.15	2.73
Other Europe	13.35	14.76	16.74	13.60	14.92	14.78	13.79	15.83	16.30	18.78
Japan	5.55	5.75	7.85	8.01	7.23	10.34	8.68	10.17	10.12	8.81
Other Countries	3.61	3.72	3.46	3.67	3.29	3.21	3.73	5.79	5.90	5.41
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

V. CHINESE SHIPPING: TONNAGE OF VESSELS ENTERED AND CLEARED.

	1880	1881	1882	1883	1884
American	287,369	224,730	167,801	150,703	21,40,741
British	9,006,156	10,332,248	10,814,779	11,003,296	12,152,949
Chinese (shipping*)	4,699,255	4,670,286	4,667,753	4,858,772	2,900,576
Chinese (junks†)	129,244	96,897	108,216	82,956	93,037
French	150,207	135,734	172,381	181,056	93,093
German	632,044	728,027	882,856	774,917	939,765
Japanese	167,902	185,892	194,584	194,861	215,105
Russian	48,369	41,865	74,751	103,109	92,547
Other Countries	153,806	224,599	305,731	241,144	178,105
Total tons	15,874,352	16,640,278	17,388,852	17,589,914	18,806,788

	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889
American	2,261,750	143,799	66,539	84,455	75,077
British	11,842,255	14,006,720	14,171,810	14,069,260	14,003,750
Chinese (shipping*)	2,109,137	5,236,027	5,508,178	5,547,170	5,813,395
Chinese (junks†)	134,397	138,794	161,945	197,359	207,131
French	73,355	158,400	180,800	268,644	269,002
German	1,217,685	1,499,296	1,486,083	1,570,035	1,582,648
Japanese	211,585	270,002	306,169	281,900	441,667
Russian	55,320	42,489	51,335	72,950	70,163
Other Countries	162,693	260,233	272,712	216,986	155,051
Total tons	18,068,177	21,755,760	22,199,661	22,307,859	23,517,884

* Vessels of the foreign type owned by Chinese and sailing under the Chinese flag.
† Vessels built and owned by Chinese, but sailing under special licenses issued by the superintendents of customs at Shanghai and Ningpo.

V. CHINESE SHIPPING: TONNAGE OF VESSELS ENTERED AND CLEARED.

	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894
American	82,946	67,095	61,328		129,127
British	16,087,895	17,438,995	19,316,815	78,175	20,496,347
Chinese (shipping *)	6,110,613	6,493,191	6,308,523	19,203,978	5,333,955
Chinese (junks †)	224,343	149,082	252,667	6,572,418	205,291
French	239,700	264,660	252,920	257,532	348,291
German	1,343,964	1,911,897	1,466,133	259,687	1,683,605
Japanese	505,181	515,236	630,868	1,508,015	379,044
Russian	87,669	98,221	111,570	566,379	138,472
Other Countries	194,208	772,411	1,039,751	132,613	667,869
Total tons	24,876,459	27,710,788	29,440,575	29,318,811	29,622,001

	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
American	86,427	165,578	269,780	239,152	310,107
British	20,525,798	21,847,082	21,891,043	21,265,966	23,338,230
Chinese (shipping *)	4,965,177	6,989,208	7,543,529	7,936,355	8,944,819
Chinese (junks †)	254,944	262,084	276,451	251,217	404,428
French	341,345	434,415	423,122	420,078	613,191
German	2,442,185	1,945,019	1,658,094	1,685,098	1,854,246
Japanese	121,691	565,992	660,707	1,569,134	2,839,741
Russian	130,218	113,656	145,660	178,768	361,501
Other Countries	869,293	1,167,823	883,976	687,812	602,067
Total tons	29,737,078	33,490,857	33,752,362	34,233,580	39,268,330

* Vessels of the foreign type owned by Chinese and sailing under the Chinese flag.

† Vessels built and owned by Chinese, but sailing under special licenses issued by the superintendents of customs at Shanghai and Ningpo.

VI. SHIPPING OF CHINESE PORTS: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TONNAGE
CARRIED UNDER EACH FLAG.

	1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889
American	1.81	1.35	.97	.86	11.38	12.52	.66	.30	.38	.32
British	60.51	62.09	62.19	62.55	64.62	65.54	64.38	63.84	63.07	63.37
Chinese Shipping	29.60	28.07	26.84	27.62	15.42	11.67	24.97	24.81	24.87	24.72
Chinese Junks81	.58	.62	.47	.50	.74	.64	.73	.89	.88
French95	.82	.99	1.03	.50	.41	.73	.81	1.20	1.14
German	3.98	4.38	5.08	4.40	5.00	6.74	6.89	6.67	7.04	6.73
Japanese	1.06	1.11	1.12	1.11	1.14	1.17	1.24	1.38	1.26	1.88
Russian31	.25	.43	.59	.49	.31	.19	.23	.32	.30
Other Countries97	1.35	1.76	1.37	.95	.90	1.20	1.23	.97	.66
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
American34	.24	.21	.27	.44	.29	.49	.80	.70	.79
British	64.67	62.93	65.61	65.50	69.19	69.02	65.23	64.86	62.12	59.43
Chinese Shipping	24.57	23.43	21.43	22.42	18.01	16.70	20.87	22.35	23.18	22.78
Chinese Junks90	.54	.86	.88	.69	.86	.78	.82	.74	1.03
French96	.96	.86	.89	1.17	1.15	1.30	1.25	1.23	1.56
German	5.40	6.90	4.98	5.14	6.70	8.21	5.81	4.91	4.92	4.72
Japanese	2.03	1.86	2.14	1.93	1.28	.41	1.69	1.96	4.58	7.23
Russian35	.35	.38	.45	.47	.44	.34	.43	.52	.92
Other Countries78	2.79	3.53	2.52	2.05	2.92	3.49	2.62	2.01	1.54
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00





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